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Abstract

In order to understand the development of the Interstate 49 corridor, which began almost
a half century ago, it is necessary to analyze the complex nature of federal aid highway
legislation. For nearly one-hundred years politicians struggled to create a comprehensive
highway program, and many felt this had been achieved with the Federal Aid Highway Act of
1956. However, the focus on the construction of interstate highways often overlooked the needs
of important secondary and primary highways. Although John Paul Hammerschmidt, the first
Republican Congressman to serve Arkansas since Reconstruction, believed the social and
economic success of the United States relied almost entirely on the continued development of a
national system of interstate highways, he understood the difficulties faced by constituents
located in isolated rural areas off the interstate highway grid. The discontinuance of privatized
passenger railroads in the late 1960s and early 1970s, hit the people of western Arkansas
especially hard. The most serious blow occurred when service ended on the last remaining
passenger trains between Kansas City and New Orleans, which left a significant transportation
void. Hammerschmidt used his power as a member of the House Public Works and
Transportation Committee to cosponsor the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1972 which would have
allowed Highway Trust Fund monies to continue to be used for both interstate and other federal
highways. The 1972 act also included a provision for the establishment of a priority primary
route system, which would insure federal funding for the improvement of key arterial routes
throughout Arkansas. Unfortunately, the bill died, and it was not until 1991 with ISTEA
(Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act) that Hammerschmidt was in a position to
secure funds for a major North-South interstate highway through Arkansas. ISTEA made

possible the construction of Interstate 540 through Northwest Arkansas. Since that time,
politicians and various interest groups continued to advocate for the development of a major
North-South interstate between Kansas City and New Orleans. Their plans were realized with
Interstate 49, now estimated to be almost eighty percent complete. When finished, it will
connect the Gulf Coast to Winnipeg, Canada.

©2015 by Anna Crayton
All Rights Reserved

Acknowledgements

I would like to especially thank John Paul Hammerschmidt for donating his vast
collection of documents to the University of Arkansas Special Collections. He has provided a
wealth of information that will serve as a priceless gift to future academics.
In addition, Dr. Jeannie Whayne deserves my special thanks for her unfailing
encouragement and continual reassurance during my times of doubt.

Dedication

It is with great pleasure that I dedicate this work to my family. This project may never
have reached completion without their unwavering love and support. To my son Rad, I hope this
will inspire you to pursue your dreams. May you learn the lessons of history, the value of
education, and the rewards of perseverance.

Table of Contents

Introduction.……………………………………………………………………….……. 1
Chapter 1………………………………………………………………………….…… 12
Chapter 2………………………………………………………………………….…… 29
Chapter 3………………………………………………………………………………. 46
Chapter 4………………………………………………………………………………. 67
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………... 84
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………… 88

Introduction

Infrastructure development played a key role in the expansion of the United States.
Central to the movement of goods and people, a modern transportation system became essential
to the growth of the national economy in the late nineteenth century. The railroad provided the
first transcontinental infrastructure system. The success of American railroads made it
impossible to conceive that rail travel would one day become obsolete, replaced by the National
System of Interstate and Defense Highways that now define transportation, infrastructure and the
United States as a whole. While an east – west corridor was crucial, visionary policy makers,
businessmen, and citizens understood the importance of a north—south corridor linking Canada
to the Gulf of Mexico, but little consensus existed over the precise route it would take. This was
compounded by the controversies within individual states reflecting the same question.
My research and writing is essentially based around the history of highway legislation,
the decline of passenger railroads, the impact this had on rural Arkansans, and the role John Paul
Hammerschmidt played in highway development and policy, particularly in the 1970s. The
construction of Interstate 49 through Arkansas has become increasingly relevant over the past
year, but few understand the history of the development of this major north – south corridor from
the seventies to the present day. While a larger goal of linking Canada to the Gulf was always
important, it often faded into the background as regional interests and issues prevailed. Renewed
demand for an interstate highway system between Kansas City, Missouri and New Orleans,
Louisiana, began in the late 1960s after the discontinuance of the Southern Belle, the last
remaining passenger rail service connecting these two major cities, which left a major
transportation void through the middle of the country.
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John Paul Hammerschmidt, in seeking to address the interests of his Arkansas
constituents, focused much of his energy on the completion of the corridor within Arkansas. He
was hampered in his efforts by a restriction on the overall interstate mileage approved by
Congress. No additional mileage was available for the construction of the important north—
south corridor so Hammerschmidt decided to pursue a complicated strategy of securing “primary
priority route” designation, essentially the next step down from an interstate designation. He
may well have had it in mind to transition this primary priority route to an interstate highway at
the first opportunity. His strategy appears to have paid off. He focused his attention on
developing the primary priority route U.S. 71 – a federal highway that runs through Missouri,
Arkansas, and Louisiana. Recently, several segments of that upgraded federal highway have
been designated as Interstate 49: From Kansas City to near the Arkansas border; from just south
of Bella Vista to I-40; and from Texarkana through Lafayette, Louisiana. Despite
Hammerschmidt’s efforts to develop an interstate through Arkansas, the I-49 project has yet to
reach full completion, with the largest unfinished segment located along the existing U.S. 71
route through southern Arkansas. There are unfinished segments in other states as well, but
when this entire interstate corridor is completed, it will connect New Orleans to Winnipeg
Canada. After almost half a century, the transportation void created when the last two passenger
railroads in this area were discontinued will finally be filled.
For many Arkansans the connection between Hammerschmidt and the development of a
north – south interstate highway between Kansas City and New Orleans may be common
knowledge. However, younger generations and those new to the area most likely have no idea
who Hammerschmidt was or the significant role he played regarding the construction of I-540,
and subsequently the expansion of the I-49 corridor. His influence over this major transportation
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route is not information that has been made widely available to the average citizen. As I-49 is
finally nearing completion, it is important to recognize Hammerschmidt’s overall impact on the
development of this project and its various effects on Arkansas and the nation as a whole. The
current construction along this route, especially in Northwest Arkansas, can be quite deceptive.
Drivers stuck in traffic due to ongoing roadwork may find it hard to believe that development of
this seemingly new infrastructure system first began almost half a century ago.
The construction of this important corridor moved along at an excruciatingly slow pace.
The reasons for this are infinite, but can be condensed into a few specific issues that are largely
the result of federal-aid highway legislation. In 1956 Congress voted in favor of a highway bill
which authorized an extraordinary amount of federal funds for the construction of the National
System of Interstate and Defense Highways. While it would initially appear that this would
benefit the development of a major north – south transportation corridor from Kansas City to
New Orleans, this legislation actually proved to be extremely detrimental to its inclusion as part
of the interstate highway system as it was not an original route designated within the initial
41,000 mile plan. After several deadline extensions and a burgeoning controversy between
urban and rural interests, interstate completion became the primary focus of the federal
government. It quickly became clear that it would be next to impossible for states to receive any
additional interstate mileage that was not included as part of the original system.
Hammerschmidt realized this but also understood that several arterial routes throughout
Arkansas desperately needed significant improvements. Instead of pursuing interstate mileage
designation for these roadways, he used his position as a member of the House Public Works and
Transportation Committee to cosponsor highway legislation in 1972 that would authorize federal
funding for the construction and improvement of priority primary roadways up to interstate
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highway standards without being included as part of the interstate highway system. The 1972
highway bill failed to be passed into law, and while the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1973
included a provision for the funding of the priority primary system, this legislation dealt a major
blow to the nation’s highway systems. The 1973 highway bill opened the Federal Highway
Trust Fund to finance urban mass transit. Road user taxes would no longer be designated
specifically for highway development, which drastically limited the priority primary routes that
would receive federal financing. 1
The debate over the location of a north – south interstate through Arkansas was
complicated by competing local interests. The controversy over the exact route placement of this
proposed transportation corridor through Arkansas began with the 1956 highway bill, which did
not designate a major north – south connection between Kansas City and New Orleans, as part of
the original interstate system. The discontinuance of the last remaining passenger railroads in
the late 1960s intensified this debate. As a result, regional disputes broke out between central
Arkansans who supported the development of U.S. 65 and western Arkansans that believed U.S
71 was the most logical location for this significant transportation corridor. Throughout the
history of highway legislation the main policy objectives have always been defined by increased
social and economic prosperity and the alleviation of traffic problems. These were common
themes used by Hammerschmidt’s constituents and other Arkansans in favor of the development
of the north – south interstate highway through specific areas across the state. While these

1. U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Public Roads,
Busting the Trust, Richard F. Weingroff, July/August 2013 Vol. 77 No. 1,
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/publicroads/13julaug/03.cfm (accessed March 30, 2015).
(Hereafter cited as: Public Roads, Busting the Trust).
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reasons helped bolster support, they also contributed to the intense arguments over route
placement, which ultimately prolonged the planning and construction of I-49 in Arkansas.
In order to understand the delay in the construction of the I-49 corridor through Arkansas,
it is necessary to examine the history of transportation legislation. Marked by many ups and
downs, the federal-aid highway program has led policy makers down a long road of trial and
error, while never quite eradicating fundamental issues such as logistics, funding, and contention
among special interest groups. The solution to all of these problems and more appeared in the
form of the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956 which is unquestionably the United State’s most
influential piece of transportation legislation. However, as it became increasingly controversial
over the years, this landmark highway bill only served to hinder the development of a major
north – south transportation corridor between Kansas City and New Orleans. Yet, together with
legislation outlined in 1972, 1973, and 1991, the 1956 highway bill directly affected the eventual
evolution of Interstate 49.
The amount of time it took to develop a route connecting Kansas City and New Orleans
shows the difficulties surrounding highway legislation. Since the first federal-aid highway act in
1916, politicians and other special interest groups have struggled to create a federal highway
system that meets all the nation’s transportation needs. In 1956 policy makers thought this goal
had finally been achieved only to realize in less than twenty years that the interstate highway
system had some major flaws. To complicate matters, in the early 1970s, a rift arose between
urban and rural states regarding the continued construction of interstate highways versus new
development of mass transit systems. These issues remained at the forefront of transportation
legislation in the 1990s and are still common themes today.

5

The first chapter of this thesis serves to highlight the historical complexity surrounding
highway legislation in the United States from its inauguration as part of the Federal Aid Road
Act of 1916, until the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956. Several pieces of transportation
legislation are crucial to understanding this evolution. The establishment of the first national
system of highways was included as part of the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1921, which
allocated a significant increase in federal funds and authorized a provision to standardize the
classification and designation of roadways within this transnational system. 2 A network of
limited access expressways was finally incorporated into the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1944
which outlined the development of a 40,000 mile National System of Interstate Highways.
However, due to America’s involvement in World War II, the United States government was
unable to provide much in the way of federal aid funding, specifically for the construction of this
system. As a result of his war experiences and the unwavering convictions of President Dwight
D. Eisenhower, in little over a decade, the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956 authorized the
federal government to provide ninety percent of funds for the development of the National
System of Defense and Interstate Highways. 3 While policy makers, highway engineers, special
interest groups, road agencies, local citizens and businesses, had always argued over the
direction of a modern infrastructure system, it appeared an agreement had finally been made in
1956. In reality, this could not have been further from the truth. While this coalition may have

2. U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Public Roads,
From 1916 to 1939: The Federal-State Partnership at Work, Richard F. Weingroff, Summer
1996 Vol. 60 No. 1, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/publicroads/96summer/p96su7.cfm
(accessed April 18, 2014). (Hereafter cited as: Public Roads, From 1916 to 1939).
3. U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Public Roads,
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956: Creating the Interstate System, Richard F. Weingroff,
Summer 1996 Vol. 60 No. 1,
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/publicroads/96summer/p96su10.cfm (accessed April 18,
2014). (Hereafter cited as: Public Roads, Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956).
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existed for a brief period of time, the convoluted nature of highway legislation has continued
well into the present day. As these various factions have continued to multiply over the past fifty
years, it has become increasingly evident that the majority of transportation advocates are simply
unable to reach an agreement regarding federal aid highway policy.
Chapter Two introduces John Paul Hammerschmidt and his role in highway
development, specifically a north – south interstate highway. Throughout Hammerschmidt’s
time in Congress he worked to assuage the antagonism between transportation lobbies in order to
create the types of legislation needed to fund the development of a major corridor between
Kansas City and New Orleans. At an early age Hammerschmidt was introduced to an extremely
diverse infrastructure system; he gained more knowledge as a young adult traveling across
country and serving as a pilot in World War II. 4 Yet despite these experiences, Hammerschmidt
made it quite clear during his Congressional career, that he believed the future of America’s
social and economic prosperity depended upon the continued development of a national highway
network. This was particularly true in his home state of Arkansas where many essential
transportation arteries were in dire need of improvements, especially the north – south routes. In
1972, Hammerschmidt used his position as a member of the House Public Works and
Transportation Committee to cosponsor a highway bill which authorized federal funding for the
immediate renovation of three major Arkansas highways. 5 However, the bill did not pass and

4. John Paul Hammerschmidt, interview by Scott Lunsford, March 30, 2009, Arkansas
Memories Project, The David and Barbara Pryor Center for Arkansas Oral and Visual History,
Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville. URL:
http://pryorcenter.uark.edu/ (accessed May 6, 2014). (Hereafter cited as: Hammerschmidt,
interview).
5. Representative Hammerschmidt of Arkansas, speaking for the consideration of The
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1972, on October 5, 1972, to the Committee of the Whole House,
H.R. 16656, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., Cong. Rec. 118, pt. 26: 34081-82. (Hereafter cited as:
Hammerschmidt, Cong. Rec., 1972).
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the following year, the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1973 authorized the diversion of trust fund
monies to be used for the development of urban mass transit. 6 Hammerschmidt and his
constituents feared that this legislation would have a devastating impact on the future of
Arkansas’s entire infrastructure system, particularly the construction of an interstate highway
connecting Kansas City to New Orleans.
The third chapter explains why the demand for this major north – south corridor was so
intense for Arkansans and outlines the debate that ensued over route placement. In the late
1960s, Hammerschmidt’s constituents and other concerned citizens across the state became
especially concerned about the state’s transportation situation when the Kansas City Southern
Railway Company ended passenger service on the Southern Belle, after almost thirty years.
With the discontinuance of this last remaining connection between Kansas City and New
Orleans, an 800-mile area was left without adequate transport. A number of Arkansans appealed
for the revival of the Southern Belle, but the impossibility of this quickly became apparent with
the end of privatized railroads and the advent of the Amtrak system as part of the Rail Passenger
Act of 1970 which did not provide any passenger service through Arkansas for well over a
decade. Hammerschmidt, of course, understood that the nation’s infrastructure had moved from
railways to roadways. He was also fully aware of the rapidly deteriorating conditions of several
of the state’s major arterial highways. Hammerschmidt’s constituents soon realized the
importance of highway development and the need for the construction of a north – south
interstate highway. Even though the federal government refused the approval of additional
interstate mileage designation, state and local officials, regional businesses, concerned citizens,
and special interest groups argued over the placement of this proposed route. As with the

6. Public Roads, Busting the Trust.
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railroads the development of any major transportation route would undoubtedly lead to economic
prosperity. The aggregation of regions across the state soon led to an intense debate over the
possible location of this north – south route from Kansas City to New Orleans. 7
Hammerschmidt attempted to settle this dispute as cosponsor of the 1972 highway bill which
would include a priority primary route system, an intermediate network of federal aid highways,
just below the interstate in importance. Despite the failure of the 1972 legislation the priority
primary system was incorporated into the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1973. However, as a
result of the highway trust fund being opened for the use of non-highway purposes,
Hammerschmidt’s original vision for this intermediate interstate system was largely unsuccessful
due to the lack of federal aid.
The fourth and final chapter provides a brief summary of the development of a north –
south interstate highway from the time between the 1973 legislation and the present day. The
seventies and eighties represented a “lost decade” in regards to interstate development, as
controversies erupted between rural states in favor of the additional designation of interstate
mileage and urban areas that supported the development of mass transit systems. The federal
government felt the original interstate system as outlined in the Federal Aid Highway Act of
1956 should be completed before considering the allocation of additional interstate mileage. 8
However, during this time there were a few exceptions to this rule, and Louisiana received the
first Interstate 49 designation. Federal funds were authorized for 200 miles of interstate
development to provide for the much needed north – south connection between Interstate 20 in

7. John Paul Hammerschmidt Papers, Special Collections Department, University of
Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville. (Hereafter cited as: Hammerschmidt Papers).
8. Public Roads, Busting the Trust.
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Shreveport, and Interstate 10 in Lafayette. 9 While Arkansas lacked a north – south
transportation corridor, it also did not have two major cities located along existing interstate
highways that needed to be directly linked to one another. This only contributed to the ongoing
debate across Arkansas regarding the route placement of this proposed corridor. Throughout this
“lost decade” Hammerschmidt used any available federal funds for the development of U.S. 71
in Northwest Arkansas. However, the area was rapidly growing and these meager funds could
not support the necessary infrastructure development. A breakthrough came in the early nineties
with the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA). As the top ranking
Republican member in the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation,
Hammerschmidt was finally in a position to significantly influence highway construction in
Arkansas. Along with three other senior congressmen, Hammerschmidt drafted legislation that
included the development of a National Highway System, which outlined specific High Priority
Corridors that were to receive immediate federal aid. The U.S. 71 route from Kansas City
through Arkansas and into Louisiana was listed as High Priority Corridor Number One. As a
result of ISTEA, Northwest Arkansas received 400 million dollars. This ultimately contributed
to the development of Interstate 540, which was officially opened to traffic as the “John Paul
Hammerschmidt Highway” in 1999 from Alma to Northwest Arkansas. Even though
Hammerschmidt retired from Congress the year after ISTEA, he became chairman of the
Northwest Arkansas Council, a nonprofit established for the improvement and development of

9. Interstate Guide: Interstate 49, History, http://www.interstate-guide.com/i049.html#history (accessed June 2, 2015). (Hereafter cited as: Interstate Guide: Interstate 49,
History).
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the region’s infrastructure systems from 1993 to 2006, and was thus strategically placed to
ensure the completion of this project. 10
In 2014, I-540 finally received official designation as part of the Interstate 49 corridor,
which will eventually connect Canada to the Gulf Coast. An estimated eighty percent of the total
1,700 mile route has already been finished; however, the Arkansas portion between Fort Smith
and Texarkana is still the largest incomplete segment. A significant amount of federal funding is
necessary to complete construction on this project, and Congress is currently struggling once
again to create a long-term, comprehensive highway bill.

10. Arkansas State Senator Uvalde Lindsey, e-mail message to author, June 19, 2015.
(Hereafter cited as: Lindsey, email); U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway
Administration, Public Roads, Creating a Landmark: The Intermodal Surface Transportation Act
of 1991, Richard F. Weingroff, November/December 2001 Vol. 65 No. 3,
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/publicroads/01novdec/istea.cfm (accessed June 2, 2015).
(Hereafter cited as: Public Roads, Creating a Landmark).
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Chapter One

Although it certainly did not happen overnight, the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956
marked a significant turning point in American highway legislation. Central elements included
the alleviation of traffic congestion along major transportation corridors, increased economic
prosperity and development, and urban renewal projects designed to support the suburbanization
of major cities. While the themes regarding modern expressway development remained similar
to highway policy goals established in the 1920s, the 1956 legislation authorized a significant
increase in federal funding that would finally enable the materialization of the National System
of Interstate and Defense Highways. For decades, politicians, engineers, road agencies,
businesses, concerned citizens, and other special interest groups grappled for a way to create a
highway program that encompassed all the complexities surrounding the logistics and funding of
road construction and development. During this time, several landmark Federal Aid Highway
Acts led up to and shaped the 1956 legislation.
Federal highway funding originated within the Federal Aid Road Act in 1916. Following
the United States involvement in World War I, the first national highway system was founded as
part of the Federal Highway Act of 1921. This led to what has been termed by scholars as the
‘golden years’ of highway building. 1 As early as 1939, engineers with the Bureau of Public
Roads, then part of the Department of Agriculture, had begun to plan a 30,000 mile express
highway system that would traverse the United States and ultimately assuage traffic problems

1. Public Roads, From 1916 to 1939.
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while simultaneously improving the nations economy. 2 It took five more years before Congress
officially sanctioned the development of the National System of Interstate Highways in the
Federal Aid Highway Act of 1944. However, the legislation did not offer any incentive for
interstate development and included no provision that required a portion of federal funds to be
used exclusively for the construction of the interstate system. 3 So, of course, we must ask why it
took the nation over ten additional years to finally install a progressive and predominately
federally funded express highway program? Unfortunately, the answer to this is more complex
than the network of interstate highways that span the American landscape today.
Throughout the course of highway development special interest groups continually
fought amongst themselves in regards to the planning, construction, and financing of roadways.
Civil engineers, city planners, farm proponents, and advocates within the trucking industry all
had different expectations for highway development. Furthermore the attempts of legislators to
appease all interest groups while creating a functional highway program quickly manifested into
an impossibly difficult task, thus road construction lagged well behind traffic demands. 4 As can
be expected, contrasting interests defined the goals of almost everyone involved in road
development. Scarcely concerned with the nation’s highway system at large, the focus of state
engineers remained at the local level as opposed to connecting state highways. The jurisdiction
and financing of rural farm-to-market roads was primarily left in the hands of the counties while
city officials directed their attention towards the improvement and funding of urban roadways.
Meanwhile, federal engineers focused their attentions on building a connecting network of
primary or trunk roads and, therefore, largely ignored the needs of rural and urban highway

2. Mark H. Rose, Interstate: Express Highway Politics, 1939-1989. Rev. ed. (Knoxville:
University of Tennessee Press, 1990), 4. (Hereafter cited as: Rose, Interstate).
3. Public Roads, Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956.
4. Rose, Interstate, 2.
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development. 5 Thus, it is an understatement to say that no clear uniformity in highway
placement, construction, and funding existed until the 1956 legislation.
Although federal financing of the nation’s roadways first began in 1916, it took forty
years for an extensive and almost entirely federally funded highway program to be put into place.
Until 1921 local and state governments paid for their portion of highway funds through property
and other taxes, while the federal government used general revenue funds to contribute to its half
of highway funding. By 1929 almost every state began to tax fuel in order to assist with the
financing of road construction and improvement. It took only a few short years before the
United States government imposed a federal gas tax on motorists in 1932. 6 Nevertheless, the
revenue gathered from both state and federal taxes on fuel was not used strictly for road
construction. This caused contention between highway engineers and policy makers. The
engineers believed that the funds received from those taxes should be devoted to the construction
and improvement of roadways. Still, state and federal highway officials continued to use these
funds for purposes other than highway development. 7 It was not until the Federal Aid Highway
Act of 1956 and the creation of the Federal Highway Trust Fund that road user fees became
exclusively designated for the sole purpose of financing the interstate system, and established a
uniform set of standards for highway construction and development. 8
A long and rocky road led up to the historic 1956 highway legislation, but forty years
earlier the wheels finally began to turn when the Federal Aid Road Act of 1916 became the
nation’s first attempt at creating a federal highway aid program. “This act was approved July 11,
1916, and provided for the participation of the Federal government in road building under the

5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., 4.
7. Ibid., 9.
8. Public Roads, Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956.
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direction of the Secretary of Agriculture, and appropriated funds for such participation.” 9 Over
the course of five years, seventy-five million dollars in federal funds would be allocated to the
states for the much needed improvement and construction of rural delivery routes and post roads.
Based on a fifty percent cost sharing ratio, the state and federal governments equally divided the
financing of road construction with every state matching half of what federal funds they
received. To determine the proportional allocation of funds, highway engineers and legislators
devised a formula based on the ratio of one-third of each individual state’s land area, population,
and road mileage, together with the national total of these three specifications. 10
In order to officially gain eligibility for the obtainment of federal highway funds as part
of the Federal Aid Road Act of 1916, the Office of Public Roads (OPR) required every state to
set up a road agency for the purpose of selecting the highway projects and route plans in need of
the greatest improvement. These selections along with engineering specifications were to then
be submitted to the Secretary of Agriculture for approval. Upon completion of new and
improved roadways, the states would assume the responsibility of upkeep and maintenance. 11
The 1916 legislation left the jurisdiction of route selections almost entirely in the hands of state
highway officials, which resulted in varying levels of road construction and improvements.
Disconnected roadways dominated the highway landscapes of individual states while

9. State of Arkansas, Department of State Lands, Highways and Improvements, Eighth
Biennial Report, For the Period Ending June 30, 1928, 11. (Hereafter cited as: Department of
State Lands, Eighth Biennial Report).
10. Ibid., 11-12; Rose, Interstate, 8; U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway
Administration, Public Roads, Federal Aid Road Act of 1916: Building the Foundation, Richard
F. Weingroff, Summer 1996 Vol. 60 No. 1,
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/publicroads/96summer/p96su2.cfm (accessed April 18,
2014). (Hereafter cited as: Public Roads, Federal Aid Road Act of 1916).
11. Department of State Lands, Eighth Biennial Report, 12; Rose, Interstate, 8; Federal
Aid Road Act of 1916.
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development of connecting routes between states was virtually nonexistent. The Arkansas State
Highway Commission addressed these inconsistencies in its Eighth Biennial Report:
Five years of operation under the Federal Aid act of 1916 indicated to the Federal
authorities that this act, with its subsequent amendments, was too loosely drawn, in that it
allowed aid in the construction of practically any road which might tend to develop the
country, whether or not it was purely local in character, and did not provide definitely
and specifically for a correlated and unified system of highways in the several States. 12

These issues quickly became apparent and as always an inescapable rift arose between certain
interest groups; some favored the continued development of farm to market roads, while other
groups propositioned for the seamless linkage of national, long distance, primary routes. 13
The Federal Highway Act of 1921 established the first national system of highways.
Compared to the previous legislation “[t]his act was much more restrictive in character and
provided for a road system, national in scope, to consist of a definite connected system of
highways in each State”. 14 In order to appease all opposing interest groups, as was becoming the
trend in highway legislation, it only required that each state use up to seven percent of its total
road mileage for the development of the national highway system. Three percent of these were
to be primary routes and four percent secondary roadways. However, the act also stated that
three-sevenths of the federal aid must be applied to the construction of a uniform system of
nationally connected state highways. Federal funds were again to be based on a fifty percent
cost sharing formula with the states. In addition, the government allocated sixty percent of
federal aid specifically for the development of the national highway system. Another drastic

12. Department of State Lands, Eighth Biennial Report, 12.
13. Public Roads, From 1916 to 1939; Bruce E. Seely, Building the American Highway
System: Engineers as Policy Makers (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), 46-51.
(Hereafter cited as: Seely, Building the American Highway System). Seely argues that the OPR,
renamed the Bureau of Public Roads in 1918, actually controlled the specification of highway
development instead of working together with the states.
14. Department of State Lands, Eighth Biennial Report, 12.
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deviation from the 1916 road legislation included the allotment of seventy-five million dollars in
federal highway funding per year, instead of spread out over the course of five years.
Furthermore, the Federal Highway Act of 1921 contained a provision to create a standardized
method for the classification and designation of routes within the national highway system. 15
By 1923, almost 170,000 miles had officially been designated as part of the national
system of highways. Engineers in both the Bureau of Public Roads and state highway agencies
worked together to determine this mileage. Two years later in 1925, a systematic method of
route markings was put into place. It designated odd numbers for north and south roadways and
even numbers for roads running east and west. The 1920s certainly marked a new era in the
history of national highway development. However, it was not until 1939 that the Bureau of
Public Roads published an interregional highway plan outlining the development of a network of
express highway systems that would connect the nation. 16
Publication of a newer but almost identical national highway plan officially became part
of American highway policy with its inclusion in the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1944. The
development of a 40,000 mile interregional network of expressways, known formally as the
National System of Interstate Highways, would be incorporated within the federal aid highway
system. The 1944 legislation charged the Bureau of Public Roads, which was now called the
Public Road Administration, with the task of determining route placement and design standards.
State and local highway officials, engineers, and members of the American Association of State
Highway Officials were to assist the Public Roads Administration with this project. 17
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Because the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1944 incorporated the National System of
Interstate Highways, it appeared that policy makers and special interest groups had finally agreed
on a progressive, transcontinental highway program. In reality this could not be further from the
truth. Due to America’s involvement in World War II, “[t]his period was characterized by: an
acute shortage of men, material and equipment, with highway construction suspended except for
war projects”. 18 Not seen as a priority, the legislation provided no additional funding for the
interstate system and no real commitment was made to accelerate its construction. 19 Federal aid
was of course allocated for the development of rural and urban roadways but interstate highways
did not receive an exclusive share of the funding. This enabled state road engineers to use
federal funds as they saw fit. Thus, The Federal Aid Highway Act of 1944 still left the planning,
routing, and construction of roadways at the local level, where the individual needs of each state
were dictated by state road agencies and engineers. 20
Ultimately, proponents of the limited access highway network simply became another
force at odds with other interest groups that wanted road development and construction to fit
their own needs. Trucking industry advocates felt that federal aid should go towards the
improvement of urban highways, while leaders of farm groups pushed for the funding needed to
improve local and rural roads. Policy makers again attempted to placate all special interest
groups. 21 Therefore, as part of the 1944 highway legislation, the national government assumed
the responsibility of partially financing four federal aid road networks. These included primary

18. State of Arkansas, Arkansas State Highway Commission, Seventeenth Biennial
Report, For the Period July 1, 1944 – June 30,1946, 7. (Hereafter cited as: Arkansas State
Highway Commission, Seventeenth Biennial Report, 7).
19. Rose, Interstate, 26; Public Roads, Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956.
20. Rose, Interstate, 16, 26; Public Roads, Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956.
21. Rose, Interstate, 16, 26; Public Roads, Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956.

18

routes, urban highways, farm-to-market or secondary roads, and the interstate system. Five
hundred million dollars in federal aid was allocated for the use of road development over the
course of three years. The state and federal governments would match funds on a fifty percent
ratio as they had always done. Distribution of funds, as outlined in the legislation, followed a
formula similar to what had been used for over twenty years. 22
The undeniable magnitude and complexity that defined federal aid highway policy for
almost half a century continued unabated as Congress began to outline the Federal Aid Highway
Act of 1956. Numerous politicians, engineers, federal and state road agencies, along with special
interest groups, helped to shape this historic highway program. However, the convictions of
President Dwight D. Eisenhower ultimately led to the creation of the intricate network of
interstate highways that crisscross the nation today.
Eisenhower’s interest in roadways first began only three years after the origination of the
first federally aided highway legislation. As a young man he participated in a transnational
motor convoy with the United State’s Army in 1919. This prolonged journey alerted the future
president to the disastrous condition of America’s roadways. Years later during World War II,
Eisenhower witnessed the ease of mobility experienced by the Allied troops as they entered
Germany by way of the German autobahn network. The advantages this type of highway system
provided did not go unnoticed. The German example impressed upon Eisenhower the
importance of modernizing American highway legislation in order to expedite the completion of
the National System of Interstate Highways. 23
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However, during his first year as United States President, the Eisenhower Administration
primarily focused on the situation in Korea. In 1953 President Eisenhower simply did not have
the time to explore his aspirations regarding interstate highway development. The following
year in 1954, Congress again examined highway legislation, and now Eisenhower turned his
attentions toward the accelerated construction of a safer, faster, multilane express highway
system. Unfortunately, the logistical and financial aspects of interstate development still
perplexed many policy makers who continued to work towards creating legislation that satisfied
all interested parties. 24
For decades, issues such as highway administration, financing, and apportionment had
caused contentions with just about everyone involved in road construction. Like previous
highway legislation, the 1954 Act attempted to appease special interest groups that had always
been at odds over the actualization of the federal aid highway program. Politicians, farm group
executives, leaders of state and national road user associations, as well as federal, state, and
county engineers each had their own ideas regarding the financing, placement, and development
of the nation’s roads. The push for better highways came from all directions, yet the Federal Aid
Highway Act of 1954 once again emphasized the gridlock in American highway politics. 25 In
order to create Eisenhower’s idea of a successful interstate highway program, these conflicting
interest groups had to reach an agreement.
Disappointed with the outcome of the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1954, President
Eisenhower voiced his frustration in a speech he prepared to be delivered by Vice President
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Richard M. Nixon at the National Governors Conference. In this address, Nixon outlined
Eisenhower’s goals for creating an advantageous national highway program:

For example, the top priority in our planning must be given to transportation, and to
health and efficiency in industries to the national defense and the national economy. A
Cabinet committee has just been established by the President to explore and to help
formulate a comprehensive transportation policy for the Nation, taking into account the
vital interests of carriers, shippers, the States and communities, the public at large. But
more specifically, our highway net is inadequate locally, and obsolete as a national
system. 26
According to Eisenhower the United States needed to find a way to quickly construct and easily
finance a vast network of interstate highways that would increase national security and improve
the economy. His goal was to create a fifty billion dollar highway program to be completed in
ten years and to find a method of financing the system that would not put the nation in debt. 27 In
order to make his vision of American roadways a reality, in August of 1954 President
Eisenhower created two separate road study committees tasked with coordinating the
acceleration and restructuring of the national highway program. Representatives of several
federal government departments served as members of the Federal Interagency Committee.
While the President’s Advisory Committee on a National Highway System consisted of
apolitical highway experts. 28
The Federal Interagency Committee examined the road construction, financing and
economic requirements necessary for the establishment of an innovative highway program.
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Proposals from road user groups, farm-to-market advocates, highway officials and engineers,
state governor associations, and trucking industry leaders also contributed to an extensive
collection of data. The Interagency Committee combined their findings with those presented by
the special interest groups and submitted them for consideration by the President’s Advisory
Committee on a National Highway Program. 29
Eisenhower’s longtime friend, an engineer and retired United States Army General
Lucius D. Clay, acted as head of the Presidential Advisory Committee. Known in short as the
Clay Committee, this highway study group used the information gathered by the Interagency
Committee and compiled a report for President Eisenhower outlining the requisite logistics for
the development of a massive federally funded interstate highway system. The Clay Plan was
officially published in January 1955. However, committee members were only publicly
perceived as being impartial and individual interests regarding the future of American highway
policy led to numerous disagreements. Thus, even with Eisenhower’s endorsement of the Clay
Plan, when Congress adjourned in August of that year, Lucius Clay’s highway bill had been
defeated in both the House and Senate. Any hopes for a reconstructed federal aid highway
program seemed slim. 30
After progress appeared impossible, the House voted in favor of an extensive highway
bill cosponsored by Congressmen George Fallon and Hale Boggs in April 1956. Fallon focused
on fund distribution, control of construction and apportionment of funds, while Boggs provided a
method for financing the interstate system. The success of this bill stemmed from the amount of
federal aid allocated to the program and its distribution. Since the beginning of the Federal Aid
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Highway System there had always been issues with the money allotted for specific roadways. 31
This highway bill apportioned record high sums for all areas of road construction with
“[c]ontract authorizations totaling $24,825 million for interstate highways and $1,850 million for
the Federal primary, secondary, and urban systems”. 32 If it passed in the Senate, an
unprecedented amount of federal aid would be provided for the development of the interstate
system as well as primary and secondary roadways. 33
Fallon’s portion of the 1956 highway bill called for a 40,000 mile system of interstate
highways to be built over a thirteen year period and included an extraordinary allotment of
federal aid to finance the interstate system. The federal government provided ninety percent of
these funds, leaving the remaining ten percent to be matched by the states. A cost to complete
formula, used to determine the allocation of funds, took the estimated cost for each state to
complete their portion of the interstate and compared that to the total cost of the national
completion of the Interstate Highway System. The Bureau of Public Roads would be responsible
for conducting the studies necessary to determine these cost estimates. 34 Fallon also outlined a
pay-as-you-go method to finance the highway program, but left the details to be resolved by The
House Ways and Means Committee. Representative Hale Boggs took on this responsibility and
created a bill to supplement Fallon’s in regards to the financing of the interstate system. This
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became known as the Highway Revenue Act of 1956. Boggs came up with the idea to create a
Federal Highway Trust Fund, which provided industrial and professional standards for highway
finance and construction. Revenue generated from fuel, tire, new vehicle, and other road user
taxes would go directly into the Trust Fund where it could not be used for any purpose other than
to finance the construction and development of the federal aid highway program. 35
The Senate Committee on Finance largely accepted the Boggs version of the highway
bill. Still, concerned that funding levels might surpass the Federal Highway Trust Fund revenue,
the Senate decided to add the Byrd-Humphrey amendment to the House bill in order to prohibit a
possible Trust Fund deficit. The amendment stated that if the Secretary of the Treasury believed
the Trust Fund balance became too low to adequately cover highway costs then the Secretary of
Commerce would have to reduce the funds allocated to each state in order to eliminate the
estimated deficiency. Other than the Byrd-Humphrey amendment, where the Senate version of
the bill differed most from the House bill was in regards to the formula for the distribution of
funds. The Senate felt that the money allocated to each state should be based on the ratio of twothirds population, one-sixth land area and one-sixth road mileage. The revised version of the
Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956 was debated in the Senate on May 28th and 29th before being
approved by a voice vote. 36
A House-Senate Conference Committee then met to iron out the differences between the
two versions of the bill. The House conferees agreed to keep the Byrd-Humphrey Amendment.
Yet, the proportional allocation of funds became a major issue among conference members.
Nonetheless, an agreement was reached to use portions of both House and Senate versions. For
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the next three years the Senate formula would be applied to the legislation, and between 1957
and 1959 funds would be distributed to the states based on land area, population, and road
mileage. Then starting in 1960 until completion of the interstate system in 1969, the House
version would take over. In order to ensure the timely and uniform completion of the interstate
system, each state’s share of interstate costs consisted of a percentage of total interstate costs.
The Conference Committee also added a small amount of additional mileage to the interstate
system. A total distance of 41,000 miles would be explicitly designated for the development of
interstate highways across the country. Committee members also decided to change the name of
the interstate system, which would now officially be known as the National System of Interstate
and Defense Highways. 37
The crucial importance and ultimate success of the 1956 highway bill can be attributed to
the significant increase in federal aid financing where “[i]n the case of interstate highway
projects” the matching ratio dictated “the Federal share . . . to be 90 percent and the State share
10 percent.” 38 It also emphasized the rapid completion of an interstate system that “will connect
. . . principal cities, and will be built to the highest modern standards.” 39 While the 1956
legislation overwhelmingly advocated for the development of the interstate system, it still
managed to appease most special interest groups. Substantial funds were allocated exclusively
for the improvement of primary, secondary, and urban roadways. However the traditional,
“[e]qual matching” fifty percent ratio between state and federal governments still remained, “in
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the case of primary, secondary, and urban systems.” 40 On June 25, 1956 the House-Senate
conference committee submitted their report, and the revised version of the bill passed in both
the House and Senate the following day. President Eisenhower then signed the Federal Aid
Highway Act of 1956 into law on June 29, 1956. 41
Almost half a century after the inception of a federally funded highway program,
highway policy finally included the immediate construction and primary financing of a
connecting network of express highways across the nation. In the forty years it took from the
first federally aided highway legislation in 1916 until the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956,
American highway policy and road development underwent an incredible transformation. The
lessons learned throughout this period by policy makers, engineers, and special interest groups
eventually helped to advance and shape American highway legislation.
In summary, over the course of five years the problems and issues that arose with the
Federal Aid Road Act of 1916 soon became apparent, and ultimately led to the inclusion of a
coherent system of national highways in the Federal Highway Act of 1921. This act signaled a
great era of road building in the United States, a time dominated by extensive highway
construction. State and federal highway engineers worked together to determine a definitive
method for the classification and designation of national highway mileage. Less than twenty
years later in 1939 plans were well underway for the development of a 30,000 mile national
network of connecting highways. This proposal officially entered the political scene as part of
the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1944, which established the National System of Interstate
Highways. Seemingly fundamental to American highway policy, the goals and plans outlined in
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the 1944 legislation proved inefficacious within the context of the United States involvement in
the Second World War. 42
Over the years federal aid highway legislation has provided an indispensible insight into
the advancement of the nations roadways. However, the legislative history can only take us so
far. Throughout the progression of the federal aid highway program, the opposition between
special interest groups juxtaposed with the conciliatory nature of policy makers, increasingly
impeded highway development. Issues regarding funding, route placement, and construction, led
to heated debates between members of the trucking industry, farm proponents, city planners,
state and federal highway engineers, as well as the general public.
Until 1956 and the establishment of the Federal Highway Trust Fund, no true uniformity
existed in regards to highway financing and development. Traditionally based on a fifty percent
cost sharing ratio, both state and federal highway funding originated primarily from general
revenues. Between 1929 and 1932, first state and then federal governments began to impose a
gas tax in order to assist with financing the national highway system. However, to the
consternation of highway engineers these funds were continually diverted to other causes and not
used exclusively for roadway development and construction. The Federal Aid Highway Act of
1956 attempted to forever change this restriction with the creation of the Federal Highway Trust
Fund. Across the nation road user fees were to be collected and deposited into a specific fund
for the sole purpose of financing federal aid highway projects. State and federal taxes on
motorists would finally be used explicitly for highway development. 43
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Less than twenty years later, dissension and division once again became central themes
regarding the future of federal aid highway legislation. Policy makers, special interest groups,
and state highway officials were at odds over the use of highway trust fund monies. In urban
areas interstate construction had become controversial and many felt the trust fund should be
opened to finance mass transit systems. Others believed that interstate highway development
remained crucial to rural areas across the country, and therefore opposed the diversion of trust
fund monies. By the early 1970s the debate over this conflict intensified, and seriously impacted
the foundation of federal aid highway legislation well into the future.
Arkansas Congressman John Paul Hammerschmidt strongly supported the continuation
of the nation’s highway program and felt that the trust fund should be used specifically for this
purpose. He understood that major transportation corridors, especially through rural areas, could
significantly effect the social and economic development of an entire region and the country as a
whole. Hammerschmidt worked tirelessly as cosponsor of the 1972 highway bill in order to
protect highway funds for highway purposes. In addition, he proposed that a new highway
program be included within the bill, which would authorize federal funding for an intermediate
system of priority primary routes. Unfortunately the 1972 highway legislation died during a
House – Senate Conference Committee. The following year Congress passed the Federal Aid
Highway Act of 1973, which included a provision for the financing of urban mass transit through
revenue generated by the Federal Highway Trust Fund. 44
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Chapter Two

Between the passage of the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956 and the controversy over
the 1972 and 1973 highway bills, John Paul Hammerschmidt became the first Republican from
Arkansas elected into the United States House of Representatives since Reconstruction. Elected
to the Ninetieth Congress, Hammerschmidt officially began his twenty-six year stint as
Arkansas’s Third District Congressman on January 3, 1967. Almost immediately he became an
active member of the House Public Works and Transportation Committee where he gained
extensive legislative expertise in infrastructure development. Particularly acknowledged for his
work regarding all aspects of the Federal-aid highway program, Hammerschmidt endeavored to
improve the nation’s secondary, primary, urban and interstate systems. 1
Esteemed by colleagues and constituents alike, his role in infrastructure development has
undeniably had a lasting impact that continues to benefit Arkansas and other areas across the
United States. As a member of the House Public Works Committee, Hammerschmidt was well
situated to express his ideas concerning the nation’s roadways and turn his objectives into
legislation designed to advance the federal highway system. His dedication to highway
construction and improvement ultimately represented his unwavering commitment to his home
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state of Arkansas. 2 He shaped federal aid highway policy in order to best serve the
transformation and modernization of Arkansas roadways. He believed in the prevalence of the
national network of federal aid highway systems and their ability to serve as the most crucial
form of transportation for both people and goods well into the future. According to
Hammerschmidt,
[u]nless the crops and other diverse products of our farms, our mines, and other rural
enterprises can be quickly and economically transported to the city markets, the rural
economy, as well as that of the urban areas, will be adversely affected. That is one of the
reasons, in this period when the trackage of our railroads is shrinking, that an adequate
road program for rural America can and must be established. 3

These beliefs led Hammerschmidt to devote an enormous amount of time and energy to insure
the continuation of the federal aid highway program and the many benefits it offered Arkansas. 4
Born on May 4, 1922 in the rural town of Harrison in Boone County, Arkansas, one of
Hammerschmidt’s earliest memories as a child was riding in his fathers Model T Ford. He
laughingly recalls that these antiquated automobiles “had a peculiar clutch and all that apparatus
. . . on the floor” and remembers how often in the Model T “somethin’ would stall out, and he
[Hammerschmidt’s father] would blow in the gas tank, and then he’d put a match or somethin’
there to hold the air in.” 5 John Paul Hammerschmidt’s experiences with this type of car
undoubtedly impacted his views regarding the modernization and improvement of transportation
and infrastructure development.
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While the Model T Ford served as his first introduction into the world of transportation,
the Model A sedan functioned as the family’s primary car during most of Hammerschmidt’s
upbringing. He recollected how often he and his four brothers and sisters went out driving with
their dad who “always had a good Model A sedan where he could put all of us kids in and get us
outta the house and outta Mother’s hair.” 6 Even in the winter John Paul’s father would take the
kids out sledding behind the family car by hooking up a homemade sled to the Model A and
driving it around through the snow on the family’s ten acres of land. 7 In those days the roads
around Harrison and most of Northwest Arkansas were gravel or dirt roads. According to
Hammerschmidt, during his childhood the highways were “gravel to Eureka Springs – and
Eureka Springs to Fayetteville,” and in “different segments . . . they began to pave roads in
Arkansas.” 8 Due to these types of road conditions, passenger trains provided a much more
comfortable and quicker method of travel, especially over longer distances.
Sometime in the early 1930s Hammerschmidt first traveled by train when he began to
accompany his father on trips for the family lumber business to Kansas City, Missouri. While a
passenger train ran through Harrison for a period of time, it mainly offered regional transport,
and the town’s railroad was primarily used as a freight line connecting the surrounding rural
areas with major trading centers. Therefore, in order to travel to Kansas City, the
Hammerschmidt’s first drove to nearby Bergman, Arkansas, and from there caught the Missouri
Pacific Railroad. John Paul remembers the luxuriousness of trains during that time period. They
were “very nice” and had “a white tablecloth diner” accompanied by “[t]he porter and the
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waiters and all that.” 9 His family “used that train till they quit running it.” 10 For the people of
Northwest Arkansas, passenger railroads provided an invaluable means of transportation to
destinations across the country, especially those trains running the major north – south route
through Arkansas from Kansas City, Missouri to New Orleans, Louisiana.
The Hammerschmidt Lumber Company also exposed the young John Paul to other
aspects of transportation. While primarily a lumber business, the family-owned company played
a role in the manufacture of busses and trucks since in those days they had a “[s]teel base, but . . .
largely wooden bodies.” 11 In his recollection of this aspect of the business, Hammerschmidt
recalled that “J.B. Hunt always told me the story about he bought some of his early truck bodies
out there. I never did see him there, but he’d always mention that to me, that he remembered
that.” 12 Thus, despite his rural upbringing, Hammerschmidt had numerous experiences early on
with the many different modes of transportation available to the American people throughout the
first part of the twentieth century.
He continued to gain more insight into the nation’s infrastructure after he graduated from
Harrison High School at the young age of fifteen and went on to attend the Citadel in Charleston,
South Carolina between 1938 and 1939. For the 1940 to 1941 school year, while awaiting his
appointment at the Annapolis Naval Academy, Hammerschmidt returned home to attend the
University of Arkansas in Fayetteville. During this time he put in a request to transfer his
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appointment from Annapolis to West Point, but this would all end with a spontaneous trip to
California over his Christmas break. 13
In the winter of 1941 Hammerschmidt began his journey into the larger world of
transportation and witnessed the extent of American infrastructure firsthand. Without the
knowledge or consent of his parents, he chose to visit a cousin in Bakersfield, California. The
attack on Pearl Harbor had just happened and California seemed like an exciting place to be for
the young John Paul who decided to stay instead of returning to school in Fayetteville at the
University of Arkansas. After a short while he got a job just outside of San Francisco at the
Mare Island Naval Ship Yard where he worked, lived, and learned many life lessons. 14
In order to finance his journey from Bakersfield to Vallejo, California to start his new job
at Mare Island, he took the Pacific Electric Railroad from Bakersfield to Long Island where he
pawned his valuables. During this time the Pacific Electric was a very inexpensive and
convenient way to travel around southern California’s coastal areas. A more traditional, long
distance passenger train transported Hammerschmidt to his final destination, and once settled in
Vallejo he rode a ferry over to the Mare Island Naval Shipyard for work everyday. 15
While living in California John Paul Hammerschmidt decided to buy himself a Model A
Ford. He recalled that “it cost a hundred and twenty-five dollars” and that he and his friends
“drove that Model A everywhere.” 16 This automobile also provided partial transportation from
California back to Arkansas a year later when Hammerschmidt felt he needed to take his life
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more seriously and become more actively involved in World War II. While the return trip began
with the Model A Ford, Hammerschmidt and life long friend Frank Lee Coffman ultimately
traveled by various modes of transportation in order to eventually reach their hometown of
Harrison, Arkansas. 17
Hammerschmidt and Coffman first took a ferry east from Benicia, California and then
drove north of Bakersfield across the Tehachapi mountain range. The young men continued
their journey on into the Mojave Desert where they were forced to drive at night due to the
extreme heat and the obvious lack of air conditioning in the Model A Ford. Hammerschmidt
recalled that “we didn’t know where we were. . . . we just got lost really out in that desert, but we
kept goin’ on roads” and eventually “hit a blacktop road” in Wickenburg, Arizona. 18 From there
the duo traveled to Carlsbad, New Mexico where Coffman had family they could stay with. At
this point in the cross-country excursion, Hammerschmidt decided to sell his Model A and with
this money the two friends were able to ride to Kansas City, Missouri on the El Capitan train.
From Kansas City they took the Missouri Pacific Railroad to Bergman, Arkansas and then
caught a ride into Harrison on the back of a truck. 19
Hammerschmidt’s California adventure allowed him to experience the multitude of
transportation options available in America during the early 1940s. This was also when he
witnessed first hand the extent of the country’s infrastructure, or lack thereof, on a truly national
scale. However, his insight into more modern modes of transportation began on October 16,
1942, when Hammerschmidt signed up as a volunteer with the Army Aviation Cadet Program.
He probably traveled by train to begin his flight training in Texas where he prepared for his role
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in World War II by learning to pilot various types of airplanes ranging from fighter-bombers to
cargo jets. 20 After receiving his wings, John Paul Hammerschmidt served as a pilot in the
Second World War between 1942 and 1945. He flew overseas in the China – India – Burma
Theater as a member of the United States Army Air Corps in the Third Combat Cargo Mission.
The majority of his two hundred and seventeen combat missions took place over the eastern
Himalayan Mountains. 21 Known as the hump, this has always been an area considered
dangerous to fly over, even during peacetime and with good weather. Yet Hammerschmidt’s
cargo drop missions were plagued by monsoons and Japanese ground fire. 22 Luckily, he made it
through these treacherous flights unscathed and by the time America dropped the atomic bomb in
Japan, Hammerschmidt had been decommissioned at Fort Chaffee. 23
His involvement in the war undeniably broadened Hammerschmidt’s understanding of
the world, exposed him to new and different methods of transportation, and introduced him to
the varying levels of infrastructure development in countries halfway across the globe. This
insight, together with his prewar cross-country travels through the United States and his rural
Arkansas upbringing certainly had a significant impact on his future in Congress as an active
member of the House Public Works and Transportation Committee. These early life experiences
undoubtedly led Hammerschmidt to consider the continued development of America’s
infrastructure a top priority.
Hammerschmidt’s involvement in politics began after the war when he once again settled
in his hometown of Harrison, Arkansas for the first time since leaving at the age of sixteen. He
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quickly assumed an active role within the community and served as a member of the Harrison
city council for a number of years. This eventually led to Hammerschmidt’s participation within
the Arkansas Republican Party although he primarily remained behind the scenes. John Paul
also took over as head of the family lumber business and while managing the Hammerschmidt
Lumber Company, he met and married Virginia Ann Sharp in 1948; shortly after they had one
son, John Arthur Hammerschmidt. 24
By 1966 Hammerschmidt started to become more publically affiliated with the
Republican Party in Arkansas. Republicans across the state hoped this would be the year for a
GOP win in the race for governor as well as in Arkansas’s Third District Congressional seat,
both held by Democrats since Reconstruction. While Hammerschmidt became actively
involved in Winthrop Rockefeller’s 1966 gubernatorial race, Arkansas Republicans soon became
greatly concerned when their 1964 Third District candidate announced his decision to no longer
run in the upcoming 1966 elections 25 Jerry Hinshaw’s decision to withdraw came as a crushing
blow to the Grand Old Party which quickly resolved to find a suitable candidate to run for the
Congressional seat in Arkansas’s Third District. Despite his active participation in aiding the
liberal Republican nominee for governor, many agreed that John Paul Hammerschmidt was the
most logical choice for Arkansas’s Third District candidate for the United States House of
Representatives. This became the crucial moment when Hammerschmidt made the fateful
decision to truly enter the public realm of politics. 26
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Hammerschmidt “thought about it very seriously” and agreed to run against Democrat
James Trimble who had served as Third District Congressman for twenty-two years. He devised
and ran his whole campaign, and while still helping Rockefeller behind the scenes,
Hammerschmidt worked to distance himself in order to create an independent message to the
voters in his district. Hammerschmidt wanted to keep the two campaigns publically separate
because he felt the people of Arkansas might think of Rockefeller as too liberal. Even though he
supported these progressive ideas, Hammerschmidt believed that in order to win in the Third
District he needed to take a more neutral stance. 27
On November 8, 1966 John Paul Hammerschmidt was elected to the United States House
of Representatives. He narrowly defeated longtime Democratic incumbent Jim Trimble by only
fifty-three percent of the votes to become the first Republican Congressman elected in Arkansas
since Reconstruction. Winthrop Rockefeller also won his campaign and was elected as the first
Republican governor to serve the state since Reconstruction. Together the success of these two
elections signified a major turning point in Arkansas politics. 28
Almost immediately after being elected into the Ninetieth Congress, Hammerschmidt’s
early experiences in the world of transportation and infrastructure quickly became paramount as
he threw himself into the House Public Works and Transportation Committee.
Hammerschmidt’s past experiences led to his passionate involvement within this area of national
politics and he worked to gain extensive legislative expertise in regards to the modernization and
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improvement of the American infrastructure and the methods of transportation necessary for
these proposed developments to become a reality. 29
Well recognized for his extraordinary commitment and dedication to his constituents,
Hammerschmidt maintained a remarkable level of communication with these individuals. He
spent most weekends in his district where he would often meet with up to seventy-five
constituents in just one day. Whether in person or by mail, telegraph or telephone,
Hammerschmidt himself or members of his staff provided prompt and sincere assistance by
corresponding not only with the people of Arkansas’s Third District but with any other
concerned citizens or special interest groups. 30
Specifically in regards to infrastructure development, state and local level government
officials, business leaders, the general public and highway user groups, all expressed varying
levels of apprehension about several different aspects of the federal aid highway program. These
included the discontinuance and abandonment of passenger and freight rail lines, cutbacks in
highway funding, the diversion of Federal Highway Trust Fund monies, and especially the need
for a north-south express highway corridor running through Arkansas. Between 1969 and 1970,
the Kansas City Southern Railway Company ended service on the Southern Belle, the last
remaining passenger train between Kansas City and New Orleans. This soon led to a major call
for the construction of a North-South interstate highway connecting these two cities. 31
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Many of Hammerschmidt’s constituents felt that Arkansas’s highways were in deplorable
condition and that immediate improvement of several north-south roads in the state was
necessary for a number of reasons. The two main highways that caused the greatest concern
were U.S 71 in the western part of the state, and the centrally located route U.S. 65. According
to the Arkansas State Highway Department each of these routes were considered high priority
construction projects. Controversy swirled around the development of a major north –south
transportation corridor, specifically the proposed location. Unfortunately, while Arkansans
clamored for a direct route between Kansas City and New Orleans, the federal government had
no available interstate mileage and did not seem likely to add more. 32
Hammerschmidt’s constituents were also concerned about the threat of Highway Trust
Fund money being diverted away from the Federal-aid highway program for the use of urban
mass transit. Many Arkansans felt that if highway money was used for the development of urban
mass transportation systems then Arkansas, a largely rural state, would not receive the funds
necessary for much needed road improvements. Hammerschmidt agreed with his constituents on
all these matters. He recognized the transportation void left by the discontinuance of railroads,
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32. Jeta Taylor to JPH, October 3, 1972; Aubrey J. Pinkston to JPH, October 2, 1972;
Springdale News September 25, 1972; Phil J. Miller to JPH, September 18, 1972,
Hammerschmidt Papers, Series V, Subs-series 2, Box 22, File 6; DuBose Murry to JPH,
November 20, 1972; Jerry Montgomery to JPH, November 21, 1972, Hammerschmidt Papers,
Series V, Subs-series 2, Box 22, File 7; Xerox copy of Speech made by John C. McClinton to
the Subcommittee on Roads and House Public Works Committee, published in the
Congressional Record, March 23, 1972, Hammerschmidt Papers, Series V, Sub Series 2, Box 22,
File 8.

39

understood the need for a major north-south corridor through Arkansas, and was also adamantly
against the diversion of trust fund monies. Hammerschmidt used his position in the House
Public Works Committee to address these issues and continuously attempted to create legislation
that would support Arkansas’s transportation needs. 33
Five years after he officially began his twenty-six years as Arkansas’s Third District
Representative, Hammerschmidt cosponsored the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1972, a bill he
believed would ultimately “prove to be as important to modernizing and improving our Nation’s
transportation network as was the interstate highway legislation of the mid-1950’s.” 34
Hammerschmidt felt that the provisions outlined in H.R. 16656, the House version of the 1972
highway bill, offered a comprehensive analysis of an advantageous federal aid highway program
that would help the United States meet all of its future transportation needs. 35
The House version of the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1972 authorized funding for the
completion of the interstate system over the course of three years. To provide a quicker method
for improving the standards of all federal aid systems other than the interstate, H.R. 16656 gave
more power to the states in order to simplify and expedite the road building process. While this
highway bill also recognized the need for vast improvements in regards to the urban program, it
did so in a way that would not reduce the importance of rural highway needs. It created a
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division between rural and urban areas yet authorized an equal increase in funding for both.
Therefore Federal funding allocated for primary and secondary roadways could only be used in
rural areas while funds for urban systems and extensions could only be used in urban areas.
Hammerschmidt strongly supported this aspect of the legislation because it would have such a
positive impact in Arkansas. 36
In addition, a new priority primary route system was outlined in section 126 of H.R.
16656. While this program deviated from traditional highway bills, Hammerschmidt anticipated
its importance for the future of the federal aid highway system and pushed for its inclusion in the
final version of the 1972 legislation. The 1968 national highway needs report designated 66,000
miles as part of an intermediate system of highways just below the interstate and just above the
federal aid primary system in terms of importance as compared to the entire national network of
all federal aid highways. Strongly in favor of this program, John Paul Hammerschmidt
expressed his unwavering support for the establishment of a priority primary route system in his
remarks made during the whole House debate over H.R. 16656. On October 5, 1972
Hammerschmidt rose before the House and made the following statement:
I am especially gratified by the committee’s recognition that within this intermediate
system there exist some 10,000 miles of highest importance, which appear logically to be
eligible for immediate funding under the $300 million authorized in this section for each
of 1974 and 1975 fiscal years.
Among the worthwhile projects within the 10,000 miles singled out by the
committee for priority attention are Highways 67, 65, and 71 in Arkansas. I know from
firsthand knowledge that these are principal arterial routes, which would substantially
upgrade the highway network in our State and significantly affect the economic and
social development of Arkansas. I am pleased that as a member of the subcommittee . . . I
was able to bring the critical needs of these particular routes to the Public Works
Committee’s attention. 37

36. Hammerschmidt, Cong. Rec., 1972, 34081-82.
37. Ibid., 34082.

41

Obviously Hammerschmidt was well aware of his constituents concerns and the needs of his
community, and worked diligently to support and create legislation that would have a positive
impact on the people of Arkansas and the state as a whole.
Unfortunately the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1972 died at the end of the 92nd
Congressional session after a House-Senate Conference Committee was unable to reach an
agreement regarding the two versions of the bill. The Senate primarily supported trust fund
diversion for urban mass transit, while the House remained committed to maintaining the
highway trust fund for the continued development of the nations roadways. Hammerschmidt and
the majority of the House felt that even though completion of the interstate system was nearing
its end, that the nation still relied almost entirely on the federal aid system of highways as the
country’s predominate means of transporting goods and people well into the future. Supporters
for the preservation of the Federal Highway Trust Fund believed the money should only be used
for its original purpose; to fund the construction, improvement and development of a seamless
national highway network that emphasized speed, safety and convenience. 38
These same issues remained at the forefront of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973 and
Hammerschmidt felt that very little had changed since the 1972 highway bill was brought before
the House. Still, after numerous committee meetings and hearings the House Public Works
Committee reported its amended version of S.502, the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1973, to the
Committee of the Whole House where it was debated for three consecutive days. It again
included the authorization for financing the completion of the interstate highway system,
separated the funding allocated to rural and urban areas with each receiving an equal share of
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federal aid funding, and allocated trust fund money for upgrading the 10,000 mile supplementary
system of interstate highways. 39 Thus, the 1973 highway bill also noted the necessity of
financing this 10,000 mile priority primary route system that Hammerschmidt so passionately
outlined as part of the 1972 legislation. Between the interstate system and the federal aid
primary system, this intermediate network of roadways had “become deteriorated, congested and
hazardous.” 40 In his remarks on the House amended version of S.502, Hammerschmidt pointed
out that “[a]lthough these primary routes are predominately rural, they, along with the Interstate
System, could serve as access to over 90% of the urban population in the country.” 41 However,
he did not mention the three main arterial routes that the 1972 highway bill designated to
Arkansas.
Members of the Arkansas State Senate and House of Representatives, along with local
Chamber of Commerce leaders and many others, all pushed for the improvement of the
highways Hammerschmidt outlined in his 1972 statement to the House. People realized the
“urgent need for additional funds to construct, improve and maintain principle arterial highways
in the State of Arkansas, such as U.S. Highway71, U.S. Highway 65, and other highways on the
Federal Aid Highway System in Arkansas and other states.” 42 The development of a major
north-south corridor connecting Kansas City to New Orleans also remained a primary concern
for a number of Arkansans, and the controversy regarding the placement of this hypothetical

39. Representative Hammerschmidt of Arkansas, speaking for the further consideration
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Henry, Hammerschmidt Papers).

43

route created a division between different regions across the state. It resulted in local businesses
and the general public each vying for federal funding and support of highway development in
their specific areas. 43 In early 1973, Arkansas State Senators highlighted the impact of road
construction in a resolution which stated that “motor vehicle transportation has played a major
role in the economic growth and development of this Nation in the post World War II period, and
that the continued expansion and improvement of the Nation’s motor vehicle transportation
system is essential to the continued economic progress and development of the Nation.” 44
However, like in 1972, the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1973 could not be agreed upon
and the legislation again went to a House-Senate Conference Committee. After ironing out
numerous details, the revenue from gas and other highway user taxes was ultimately diverted
from the Federal Highway Trust Fund for the use of urban mass transit. This represented a major
departure from the 1956 legislation that designated the trust fund strictly for highway
development alone. On August 13, 1973, President Nixon signed the Federal Aid Highway Act
of 1973 into law. 45 The repercussions from the passage of the 1973 highway legislation would
be felt throughout Arkansas and many other rural areas for decades to come. Yet
Hammerschmidt continued to work tirelessly for his constituents and their concerns regarding
Arkansas roadways. Over the next twenty years until he retired from the United States House of
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Representatives, Hammerschmidt made every effort to create and support any bill that would
provide Arkansas with as much money as possible to improve many of the state’s major
highways. Through his hard work and dedication to his constituents, Hammerschmidt laid the
groundwork that would ultimately lead to the construction of a north-south interstate connecting
Kansas City to New Orleans. Unfortunately the development of this did not come to fruition
during his time in Congress. 46
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Chapter Three

The demand for a major north – south transportation route connecting Kansas City to
New Orleans intensified in the early 1970s. The demise of passenger rail service across the
country and poor roadway conditions ultimately fueled America’s need for the swift completion
of the interstate highway system. In rural areas especially, the discontinuance of passenger
railroads crippled the economy, and the transportation of people and goods practically screeched
to a halt. Local communities in Arkansas began to push for the allocation of additional interstate
mileage, which led to regional controversies over highway development, funding, and route
placement. Dedicated to his constituents and his home state as a whole, John Paul
Hammerschmidt was well aware of the dire situation of Arkansas’s infrastructure. He
recognized that a number of roadways required vast improvements in both his district and
throughout the state. Thus, Hammerschmidt used his influence in Congress and as a member of
the House Public Works and Transportation Committee to push for the development of Arkansas
highways, specifically a north – south corridor from Kansas City to New Orleans. 1
Up until the middle of the twentieth century railroads reigned as the primary means of
transport for goods, people, and information. The rail system that crisscrossed the United States
was the foundation of the nations infrastructure. 2 While the decline of railroad domination
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began soon after the First World War as automobiles became more affordable for the average
middle class family, its demise was not truly felt by Americans until half a century later. The
reasons for the downfall of the railroads cannot solely be attributed to the advent of the
automobile, and are in fact so extensive and complex that entire historical narratives have been
devoted to this topic alone. 3 However, in the late sixties and early seventies the main issue was
not necessarily why the railroads quit running. Instead, most Arkansans were much more
concerned with how to remedy the negative effects. While the answer seemed obvious, the
solution proved to be more difficult as the federal aid highway system became increasingly
entangled in bureaucratic red tape and political battles between rural and urban interests. 4
For well over a century, railroads represented the fastest and most reliable mode of
transportation. This transcontinental network created the first, truly modern, national
infrastructure. Largely responsible for both the expansion and consolidation of the United
States, passenger rail services increasingly connected people and places across the nation. Thus,
railroads played an invaluable role regarding American industry and its remarkable evolution
over a relatively short period of time. At the turn of the twentieth century many railroads
received public subsidies from local governments hoping to reap the economic benefits that
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derived from connecting to the growing railway network. As the major form of transcontinental
transportation, the railroads proved to be equally important in regards to national defense, and
became crucial to domestic involvement in several major wars. 5
The railroads completely revolutionized the American way of life and had become a
seemingly permanent fixture in the country’s landscape. However, the foundation of the nation’s
transportation system began to slowly decline in the 1920s. The deterioration of passenger rail
service especially, became alarmingly evident in the years following the Second World War.
The United State’s involvement in World War II represented a time that ultimately signified the
last great boom for American railroads. The atrophy of private passenger lines during the post
war period led to their near extinction within little more than a decade. Many fundamentals
contributed to the mid twentieth century decline of railroads. These included lost market share,
abandoned track mileage, numerous bankruptcies, and loss of employment. 6
Additionally, the introduction of more viable transportation options increasingly
threatened railroad stability. The most significant example of this was the Federal Aid Highway
Act of 1956, which allocated the development of the interstate highway system. This legislation
devastated the railroad industry and ultimately caused the dissolution of privatized passenger
railroads. By this time most railroads depended almost entirely on freight revenue. However, a
significant amount of this income was lost to large motor carriers traveling on the newly
developed portions of the interstate highways and thus provided a far more flexible delivery
method than freight trains could ever have hoped to achieve. The loss of revenue made it
financially impossible for the railroads to continue running their passenger lines, and this
combined with the continued evolution of highways and automobiles enabled people to
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comfortably and quickly travel long distances, which ultimately led to the end of privatized
passenger rail service. 7
During the 1960s and early 1970s, railroads across the country sought to discontinue
passenger services by any means possible. Many simply assumed a blatant disregard for the
train traveling public. Passenger railways became increasingly unreliable, and no longer
provided adequate customer service. 8 The negligence did not go unnoticed and ultimately
helped to achieve the desired result as people began to realize that railway “passengers have
gone to other methods of transportation due to being discouraged by the railroad companies
themselves.” 9 The deficit from passenger rail services had become so great that railroads could
no longer supplement lost revenue through freight transport.
However, for a time World War II revitalized passenger train service in the United States
and this could not have been more beneficial for the Kansas City Southern Railway Company
(KCS). In 1939 KCS purchased the Louisiana and Arkansas Railway Company (L&A) and thus
acquired what would become one of its most important routes. Ownership of the L&A provided
Kansas City Southern, the smallest of the major American railroads, with a vital link between
Kansas City, Missouri and New Orleans, Louisiana. Less than a year later amidst much fanfare,
KCS inaugurated the Southern Belle, a new streamlined passenger train which offered luxury
service from the heart of the Midwest to the Gulf Coast’s largest port. 10
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The location of the KCS Southern Belle not only provided a direct link between Kansas
City and New Orleans, but it also served as a major north – south transportation corridor for
numerous people throughout portions of Missouri, Kansas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Texas, and
Louisiana. Covering a distance of over 800 miles, the track of the Southern Belle never strayed
too far from U.S. highway 71 but moved back and forth across the Missouri – Kansas border and
then followed the Arkansas – Oklahoma border to Texarkana, and continued south with U.S. 71
into Louisiana. The proximity of the Southern Belle to U.S. 71 is quite significant for numerous
reasons, especially regarding the eventual discontinuance of the last two remaining KCS
passenger trains, and the ensuing arguments over route placement for a major north – south
interstate highway. 11
While the railroad boom brought on by the Second World War was short lived, the
Kansas City Southern Railway Company was one of the few major railroads that attempted to
continue providing upscale service to its customers during a time when many other railroad
companies purposefully neglected their passenger lines in order to expedite the processes of
discontinuing these routes. KCS tried to remain positive despite losses and felt that the Southern
Belle in particular provided a necessary public service to the people along its route. In fact, in
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1965 Kansas City Southern became the last private railroad in the United States to invest in
passenger rail cars. 12
All passenger trains including the Southern Belle took another major financial blow when
the Post Office Department announced the cancellation of all Railway Post Office (RPO)
services. Mail would now be processed by machines in regional centers instead of by United
States Postal Service employees in RPO cars on passenger trains. Subsidized largely by RPO’s,
this decision had a profoundly negative impact on passenger railroads. For the Southern Belle
RPO service ended in 1967 and less than a year later the railroad was faced with another crisis
when the Railway Express Agency (REA) responsible for package and parcel transport and
delivery followed in the RPO’s footsteps and rescinded all express carrier business from most
passenger trains. 13
The revenue lost with these two services was devastating and forced Kansas City
Southern to rethink its continuation of passenger trains. Even before KCS lost its REA contract
the company had already filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to discontinue
all remaining passenger rail lines in December of 1967. The ICC allowed all KCS passenger
services to be cancelled except for the Southern Belle, which was considered to be of too great
importance to the public good to be discontinued. However, on November 15, 1968, after more
financial hardships KCS again reached out to the ICC for permission to drop its last remaining
passenger trains between Kansas City and New Orleans. Surprisingly, less than two months later
KCS withdrew their application to terminate trains number one and two of the Southern Belle.
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Regardless of lost revenue both the ICC and KCS recognized the importance of this route and
what it meant to the public. 14
For close to thirty years the KCS and the Southern Belle profoundly impacted the people
and communities it serviced. Throughout western Arkansas the possibility of passenger services
being discontinued caused significant concern. Mrs. Newton Smith from a small town just north
of Texarkana described how much she and her husband depended on the Southern Belle, “[w]e
travel on it always when visiting our children up north, as do many people in this area. We are to
old to drive and its to expensive to fly. It’s been the standby for travel through the years and its
simply not right for them to remove it now.” 15 In Fayetteville, Mrs. Rachel Stout voiced her
support for passenger rail service, “[s]peaking for myself and others that live in this part of the
country, it means a lot to us. I always travel by train I intend to as long as the trains go.” 16 Alice
Starr, a school teacher from Mena, Arkansas wrote to Hammerschmidt that she hoped he was
“still working to keep our passenger train service on the Kansas City Southern from Kansas City,
Mo. to New Orleans, La. We need the passenger train service and it would be tragic to stop
them.” She also remarked that “[w]e had good mail service when the passenger trains were used.
I hope they will be used again soon.” 17 These women and countless other people used the
Southern Belle as their primary means of travel, yet even so, KCS could no longer handle the
passenger trains deficit.
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Thus KCS was forced to reapply with the Interstate Commerce Commission for the
discontinuation of the Southern Belle due to more financial difficulties. This time around the
ICC granted permission for the Kansas City Southern Railway Company to discontinue its last
two remaining passenger trains with service from Kansas City to New Orleans. After decades of
providing luxury passenger rail service the Southern Belle officially stopped running on
November 3, 1969 and left an area of over 800 miles with few transportation options. 18
Since many rural states relied heavily on train travel, their roadways received far less
attention than the more densely populated, urban states across the country. Out of the 41,000
total miles designated for the interstate highway system as part of the Federal Aid Highway Act
of 1956, the Arkansas segment consisted of roughly 500 miles. The original route proposed for
the construction of interstate highways “from Memphis to Little Rock, from Little Rock to Fort
Smith, from Little Rock to Texarkana and from West Memphis to the Missouri line.” 19 No
interstate mileage was designated to the western part of the state, and with the discontinuance of
the Southern Belle, Arkansas lost one of its most important transportation arteries.
Unfortunately, at this time the federal government was unwilling to add any additional mileage
to the interstate system, which essentially resulted in a major transportation void between Kansas
City and New Orleans. 20 The distance between the originally designated north – south

18. Duggan, “Kansas City Southern Railway”.
19. Arkansas State Highway Commission, Twenty-Second Biennial Report, For the
Period Ending July 1, 1954 Through June 30, 1956, 15. (Hereafter cited as: Arkansas State
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Lipsey, Jr. of COFLEX (Committee for the Louisiana Expressway) to Smith, February 13, 1972;
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interstates left hundreds of miles in the middle of the country with few transportation options,
and the new Amtrak system did not help to address this discrepancy. In 1971 the closest north –
south Amtrak routes ran through either Memphis or Oklahoma City, the entire state of Arkansas
had been excluded. 21
Almost immediately following the discontinuance of passenger rail service Arkansans
began to more fully appreciate the poor quality of the state’s outdated roadways. The existing
two-lane highways had not been designed to withstand high traffic volumes and were quickly
becoming overcrowded and dangerous. By 1972 the majority of Hammerschmidt’s constituents
were not only clamoring for the improvement of Arkansas’s most heavily traveled primary road
systems, but also for the construction of a major north – south corridor that would connect
Kansas City to New Orleans like the Southern Belle had just three years prior. Support for the
development of such a major project was overwhelming and came from businesses, large and
small, local and state government officials, and the general public. However, the location of this
proposed route was hotly disputed. People in the central part of the state argued that it should
follow U.S. highway 65, while western Arkansans felt a more logical placement would be along
U.S highway 71. Yet while this controversy raged at the local and state level, the reality
remained that the federal government refused to designate any additional mileage to the
interstate highway system.
Once the people of Arkansas realized that the passenger rail lines would not re-establish
service, they began to understand the great necessity for improving a number of roadways
throughout the state. Of course, this led to regional disputes over highway development. Local
communities and businesses felt the need was greatest in their specific parts of Arkansas. Just
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like with the railroads, economic growth and prosperity followed the interstate highway system,
which led community leaders to support the development of a major north – south corridor
through Arkansas. The central issues surrounding this project included interstate mileage
designation, route location, and whether the state would be able to receive the federal funding
necessary for such an extensive project. These concerns would remain at the forefront of this
debate for many long years to come. 22
John Paul Hammerschmidt recognized the negative impact that stemmed from the
discontinuance of passenger trains and sympathized with his constituents concerning this loss.
He grew up traveling by train, and as a child made numerous trips on the Missouri Pacific
Railroad from Northwest Arkansas to Kansas City with his family who “used that train till they
quit running it.” 23 Hammerschmidt understood firsthand how vital passenger train service was
to the people of Arkansas but he also knew that the great era of railroads had come to an end. He
believed that “the continued development of our Nation’s road systems is a matter of the highest
priority, affecting the economic development of all regions and the lives of virtually all
citizens.” 24 Limited-access super highways represented the future of American transportation
and infrastructure, and Hammerschmidt worked tirelessly to insure that Arkansas would not be
left behind.
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Just as the Second World War revitalized the railroads, the post war period of prosperity
fueled automobile popularity and availability like never before. As passenger rail travel faded
into the past, America’s obsession with cars continued full speed ahead. Unfortunately, the
highway system in Arkansas could not keep up with traffic demands. The ‘golden era’ of
highway building had long since come and gone. Many of the existing roadways that made up
the state’s major transportation arteries were in various stages of disrepair and all required vast
improvements. Hammerschmidt’s constituents throughout the third district voiced growing
concerns regarding the condition of these highways, specifically the main north – south arterial
routes, which they felt were too heavily trafficked and thus unsafe and inconvenient.
Mrs. Harold C. Holmes from Bentonville, Arkansas wrote to Hammerschmidt as a
“concerned citizen” in July 1971 about her family’s recent cross country journey. She said that
“[a]fter just traveling over 5,000 miles and in 11 states we came home to the deplorable road
conditions which were not evident in other states.” Holmes went on to address the high accident
rate in relation to road conditions; she informed Hammerschmidt that “[o]n a recent weekend 10
persons died on Arkansas highways” and that since moving to the area in 1968 she had not
witnessed any “evidence of conditions improving.” 25 The following year Hammerschmidt
received similar correspondence from another constituent, a Mr. Phil J. Miller who remarked that
several summer trips to various places throughout the nation, led him to “form an attitude toward
the disparity between the East-West and North-South highway systems.” 26 Miller’s realization is
most significant in terms of Arkansas. The plight of the highway system appeared to grow
increasingly more desperate in the years following the discontinuance of the Southern Belle, yet
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this also signified the beginning of Arkansas’s fight for the designation and development of a
north – south interstate highway.
However, in the early 1970s with the interstate highway system nearing completion it
was unlikely that the federal government would add any additional mileage. Unfortunately the
Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956 had one major flaw that slowly became apparent and
ultimately ruined an almost perfect piece of highway legislation. The engineers and planners
only thought in terms of a connecting system of transcontinental superhighways, and little
consideration was given to the impact of interstate development in urban areas. The dynamic of
many major American cities had long been established and these areas simply were not designed
to allow for express highway construction. The interstate system cut through urban areas and
caused the displacement of entire neighborhoods. From the beginning highway engineers and
developers struggled to determine interstate route placement through major cities. In an effort
not to negatively impact downtown homes and businesses, urban highways tended to be located
along obsolete waterfronts or through city parks. However these route locations proved to be
even more detrimental to interstate development and caused major urban blight, especially the
expressways routed through low income inner-city neighborhoods with predominately black
populations. The interstate highway system quickly became tied to the civil rights movement.
Thus, by the early seventies the numerous controversies surrounding expressway development in
urban areas became central themes for many policy makers in regards to highway legislation.
This proved to be detrimental to interstate construction in rural states that still desperately needed
improvement of all federal aid systems, as well as the designation of additional interstate
mileage. 27
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As a result, many Arkansas motorists simply pushed for four-lane roads instead of limited
access highways. On July 31, 1972 Arkansas State Senator Morris M. Henry described the
reality of transportation and infrastructure in his district, and appealed for Hammerschmidt’s
assistance. He reported that “[h]ere in Northwest Arkansas, we have a very deplorable situation
in that Highway 71 North and South is the only main artery for transportation coming from
Kansas City going south to New Orleans.” According to Henry “[t]he large amount of traffic and
the high accident rate on Highway 71” further emphasized the necessity to upgrade the existing
U.S. 71 to a four-lane highway. In closing, he asked that Hammerschmidt do “anything you can
do to help us gain a four-lane highway.” 28 In the central part of the state “[a] group of public
officials and other concerned citizens appealed to the Arkansas Highway Commission on
January 26,1972, asking that the entire length of U.S. 65 be constructed as a four-lane facility.” 29
All across the state people solicited Hammerschmidt’s influence in the hopes of developing new
and improved highways, especially a major north –south corridor.
Within central Arkansas there were a number of proponents for the development of U.S
65 as the major transportation corridor connecting Kansas City and New Orleans, especially
since that route would not bypass Little Rock. State of Arkansas House of Representative
member Mr. A.J. Troxell was a staunch advocate for “the expansion of the Highway 65 system
from Kansas City, Missouri to New Orleans.” He believed that “[n]o interstate route would be of
more service to Arkansas” and that “[f]or every reason submitted for a different route location,
there are three reasons why the central route would be most advantageous from every
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standpoint.” 30 On February 17, 1972 a Mr. and Mrs. Phillip Faucet from Eureka Springs wrote
to Congressman Hammerschmidt regarding Highway 65 and stated that the roadway “needs to
be widened or made a super highway.” According to the couple, visitors often “complain that
the roads are dangerous, narrow, winding, hilly, and poorly marked” they felt that improvements
to this particular route “would increase the tourist traffic and income levels in this area.” 31
Hammerschmidt expressed his agreement and assured his constituents that the development of
highway 65 was a top priority.
Hammerschmidt was equally enthusiastic about the construction of a transportation
corridor along the existing U.S. highway 71, a location that western Arkansans believed to be a
much more logical choice for a north – south expressway. Fayetteville Chamber of Commerce
President W.G Brandon spoke on behalf of the Chamber in a 1972 letter to Hammerschmidt.
Brandon stated that a major highway should be constructed “parallel [to] U.S. Highway 71 and
serve as a major artery between Kansas City and New Orleans.” He went on to explain the
importance of developing such a route:
Those of us living in Washington and Benton Counties know that our area is just about
the fastest growing area in the State of Arkansas. At the same time, we feel that we have
been very much neglected in the field of transportation. There are two interstate systems
traversing Arkansas. Naturally, both of these systems run through Little Rock. We feel
that providing a 4-lane highway North-South through Central Arkansas would be
completely disregarding the western portion of the state. 32
The Arkansas Director of Highways noted similar findings, and expressed to Hammerschmidt
that an increasing number of citizens showed “considerable interest in the improvement of U.S.
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71 in northwest Arkansas.” He also made it clear that “[f]rom a practical standpoint, we realize
that if improved highway service is not provided to northwest Arkansas, this fantastic growth
area will strangle in its own prosperity.” 33 Thus began the battle over route placement for a
major north – south corridor through Arkansas.
The correlation between highway development and local economies became increasingly
apparent to Arkansans when the federal government began attempts to withdraw from highway
development as the interstate highway system neared completion in the early seventies. They
realized that the limited amount of interstate mileage originally designated to Arkansas would
not be enough to address the growing needs of the state. Unfortunately, the state and federal
ideas regarding the future of the Federal Aid Highway System were largely at odds during this
time. Highway development progressed much quicker in states that were more densely
populated and urbanized. Thus, many at the federal level believed it was time for the country to
focus on the development of other modes of transportation. 34 However in Arkansas, Director of
Highways Ward Goodman outlined the situation when he stated in early 1972 that “[h]ighways
continue to be in vogue in Arkansas even though this might not be the case in some of our more
populated States.” 35 The existing roadways in primarily rural states still required a significant
amount of attention, not to mention additional interstate mileage. This issue became one of the
major controversies addressed in the 1972 and 1973 federal-aid highway bills.
Arkansas undoubtedly lagged behind in regards to highway development and as more and
more people began to realize the adverse affects of poor roadways on the economy there became
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a number of highway advocate “groups actively supporting the development of select corridors
in Arkansas.” According to Ward Goodman, “[i]n addition to…[the] “North-South Interstate”
effort,” these included “the Western Arkansas Route, the U.S. 65 Route, the U.S. 67 Route from
Little Rock to the Missouri Line, and the Northeast Arkansas Corridor, which is a part of the
proposed Kansas City to Atlanta Route.” 36 While each of these groups focused on specific
regions throughout the state, the underlying fact remained that for Arkansas economies to
flourish more highways were needed, and federal support would be necessary in order for any of
these proposals to possibly become a reality. J.D. Roebuck, the Executive Director of the
Department of Industrial Development for the State of Arkansas outlined the dire situation in a
letter to proponents of the Razorback Expressway, a north – south route from Kansas City to
New Orleans. In this correspondence he stated that “[i]n reviewing industrial placement
throughout Arkansas in recent years, we find an alarming trend which could destroy the
distribution of economic activity. With the event of four lane-highways and the Interstate system,
industry has tended to gather along these strips, placing us in a disadvantageous position in
regard to other areas.” 37 Hammerschmidt understood this all too well but he also knew that the
federal government would not designate the extensive amount of interstate mileage necessary to
link Kansas City to New Orleans.
Therefore as a member of the House Public Works and Transportation Committee and
cosponsor of the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1972, Hammerschmidt worked to secure the future
of American highways. He used his influence to put together legislation that he felt would “go a
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long way toward meeting our Nation’s transportation needs.” 38 This bill was significant for a
number of reasons but largely because it focused on the different needs of all highways within
the federal aid system. Funds were authorized for the deadline of the Interstate System to be
extended by three years. Upon its completion the federal aid highway program would then turn
its full attention on upgrading all other roads within the system. Meanwhile each state would be
given more control over all highways other than the interstate in order to accelerate planning and
development. Clashes between rural and urban interests led the committee to deviate from
previous legislation regarding the allocation of the Highway Trust Fund. Now, for the first time
the money would be divided and strictly specified for use in urban or rural areas, while equal, the
funds were not interchangeable. The condition of rural roadways was obviously a concern for
Hammerschmidt and his cosponsors and they designed their legislation to insure these highways
could no longer be ignored. 39
The last and most significant aspect of the 1972 highway bill was its proposal of a new
program, the priority primary system, which would enable the continued construction and
development of 10,000 miles of federal aid primary roadways. In Capitol Report 292,
Hammerschmidt informed his constituents that the “[d]esignated mileage would be improved
beyond present standards, as the traffic situation warranted, up to as exacting standards as those
for the Interstate Highways.” He felt that “[t]his provision gives realistic hope for the muchneeded development of major north-south transportation corridors in Arkansas.” 40 However,
Hammerschmidt made it very clear that while they “are not more interstate miles…[t]hese
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10,000 miles need priority consideration and should be built to high standards taking into
consideration the heavy traffic volumes they handle.” 41
With the priority primary system Hammerschmidt felt that a balance could be reached
between the highway needs of certain rural states and the reluctance of the federal government to
issue additional interstate mileage. As an added bonus, the program would directly impact
Arkansas. Heavily trafficked and in drastic need of repair, U.S. highways 65, 71, and 67, would
all be included as part of the 10,000 miles designated within the priority primary system.
Hammerschmidt believed these were “principle arterial routes which would substantially
upgrade the highway network in our State and significantly affect the economic and social
development of Arkansas.” 42 Since two of these were the roadways that many Arkansans had
proposed as becoming a major north – south transportation corridor, the priority primary system
appeared to be the best solution all around.
However, the 1972 highway bill died after a House-Senate Conference Committee was
unable to reach an agreement regarding the terms of the bill, specifically the allocation of
Highway Trust Fund monies and the development of urban transit systems. Since its creation the
Highway Trust Fund was used strictly for the purpose of funding highway construction and
development, yet, the Senate added an amendment to the 1972 bill allowing a portion of the trust
fund to be used for the development of urban mass transit. The majority of the House was
opposed to this amendment, especially Hammerschmidt, his cosponsors, and his constituents
who were all adamantly against the diversion of trust fund monies. They felt that the nations
economy depended on the highway system and that the Trust Fund should be used to upgrade
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primary roads, to interstate standards if necessary. Hammerschmidt understood that rural areas
needed a way to transport goods and people following the decline of railroads. 43
The same issues outlined in the 1972 bill were at the forefront of the Federal Aid
Highway Act of 1973. The Senate still wanted to divert a portion of the Highway Trust Fund for
the development of urban mass transit. The majority of the House did not agree and felt that the
deviation of the Trust Fund would further impede efforts to improve primary roadways in rural
areas. The transportation needs within major metropolitan centers were vastly at odds with the
nation’s more agrestic states. 44
In 1973 the Senate began work on a new highway bill and by March, S.502 passed in the
Senate by an overwhelming majority. This version of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973,
allocated eighteen billion dollars to be used over the course of three years for the federal funding
of the highway program. However, the Senate bill also approved the diversion of the portion of
Trust Fund money allocated for urban highway systems to be used for the development of rail
transit. In addition, the bill enabled local urban officials the power to veto the construction of
controversial interstate routes without forfeiting federal funding, and instead use the money to
finance any transportation option deemed appropriate, including rapid rail transit. S.502 also
increased Urban Mass Transportation Assistance (UMAT) funds by three billion, with four
million per year set aside exclusively for transit operating subsidies. 45
Following Senate approval, the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973 moved on to be
debated by the House, yet members continued to take a firm stance and opposed the diversion of
the Highway Trust Funds for the financing of urban rail transit. Thus, the 1973 highway bill
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approved by the House in April maintained that the Trust Fund could only be used for the
development of federal-aid highway systems or highway oriented transit. The majority of the
House believed that if cities wanted federal funding for urban rail transit, then this money should
come from the general Treasury, not the Highway Trust Fund. Likewise, if local city officials
did not support the construction of proposed urban interstate routes and instead favored nonhighway transit options, they could cancel inner city portions of designated interstate mileage.
However, if urban areas chose this alternative the federal-aid provided for such projects would
be revoked and cities would need to apply for general Treasury funds in order to pursue
alternative transportation options. The House bill also allocated three hundred million annually
to be used for the improvement of interstate subsidiaries or priority primary routes. For Urban
Mass Transit Assistance the House authorized three billion in federal funds but this would come
from the general Treasury, not the Highway Trust Fund. 46
The extreme differences between the Senate and House versions of the 1973 highway bill
were quite similar as in the previous year and from the beginning it looked as if the Conference
Committee would once again be deadlocked. Conferees argued over the bill for close to three
months before finally reaching a compromise proposed by House Representative James Wright
Jr., which ultimately helped to ease House members into the idea of opening the Federal
Highway Trust Fund for urban mass transit. According to Wright’s plan, during fiscal years
1974 and 1975 cities that chose to develop rail and bus transit would have to use funds from the
general Treasury. However, in fiscal year 1975 urban areas could use two hundred million of the
designated eight hundred and fifty million allocated from the Highway Trust Fund for urban
systems if the money was used only to acquire busses. By fiscal year 1976 all urban system
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funds supplied through the Highway Trust Fund, could be used for any type of mass transit
project that local city officials felt would be most beneficial, including rapid rail transit.
However, “[w]hen a community withdrew a controversial urban interstate segment in favor of
transit projects, bus or rail, the funds would come from the general Treasury, not the Highway
Trust Fund.” 47 The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973 as laid out in the Conference Committee,
passed in the Senate on the first of August and was approved by the House just two days later.
On August 13, 1973 President Nixon signed the highway bill into law, which authorized federalaid highway funding for the next three fiscal years, and ultimately changed the course of
highway policy.
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Chapter Four

The primary focus of this paper has centered around the time between the late 1960s and
the early 1970s. While the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1973 was a significant piece of highway
legislation, the story does not end here for John Paul Hammerschmidt, or for the push for a major
north – south corridor through Arkansas connecting Kansas City to New Orleans. In fact, the
early nineties signify a crucial turning point in American infrastructure legislation, which many
believe to be as important as the 1956 highway bill and its authorization of the National System
of Interstate and Defense Highways. The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of
1991 (ISTEA) paved the way for the funding and construction of Interstate 540 from Alma to
Bentonville and, ultimately led to the development of Interstate 49. Thanks to Hammerschmidt
and his work on ISTEA, I-540 was completed in its entirety by 1999. 1 Less than twenty years
later this segment received official designation as part of the new I-49 corridor. However, plans
for Interstate 49 have greatly exceeded the original north – south route proposal to link Kansas
City and New Orleans. The proponents of this major corridor have now begun to concentrate on
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the continued expansion of I-49, and its future development as an international interstate
highway between the United States and Canada. 2
Following the discontinuance of the last remaining north – south passenger rail service
through Arkansas in the late 1960s, Hammerschmidt’s constituents grew increasingly more
concerned with the deterioration of existing highway conditions in Arkansas in the 1970s and
1980s. Many people felt that this area desperately needed a major transportation corridor
connecting Kansas City and New Orleans. However, due to the lack of federal funds, and as a
junior member of the House Public Works and Transportation Committee, Hammerschmidt was
not in a position to make any significant changes in regards to infrastructure development at this
time. From the information I have pieced together throughout the seventies and eighties, it
appears that it was quite difficult for any great strides to be made concerning highway
development, especially for the construction of a north – south expressway connecting Kansas
City and New Orleans. For the most part, federal aid highway policy had shifted its focus to the
completion of the interstate highway system but policy makers were opposed to designating any
additional interstate highway routes.
Even though at this point in his Congressional career Hammerschmidt had little influence
over highway development, he brought attention to the state’s infrastructure needs whenever
possible. According to Arkansas State Senator Uvalde Lindsey, the 1980s almost represented a
lost decade for Hammerschmidt in regards to his work with the development of transportation
and infrastructure. He was able to secure only modest and varying levels of federal funding and,
in fact, appeared to be more concerned with other issues. In 1972 Hammerschmidt sponsored a
major piece of legislation, which made the Buffalo River the first free flowing stream added to
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the national park system. Then in 1974, Hammerschmidt faced his toughest campaign battle
throughout his time in Congress, against future President Bill Clinton. The election was close,
yet Hammerschmidt’s relationship with his constituency ultimately led to his reelection.
However, the campaign took up a significant amount of his time and energy. Thus,
Hammerschmidt was tied up with other Congressional obligations and according to Lindsey the
decade was lost in regards to infrastructure development. 3
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the interstate highway system and the future of
American transportation and infrastructure had become increasingly more controversial.
Opposing forces lined up according to the following: (1) those who supported merely finishing
the existing plan of interstate development; (2) those who wanted to add additional interstate
corridors to the mix; and (3) those who believed highway funds should be devoted to
development of mass transit in urban areas.4 In rural states like Arkansas the interstate system
appeared incomplete in some areas and nonexistent in others. Federal funding and designation
of additional interstate mileage was necessary in order to supplement the gaps left by the existing
system.
During the “lost decade,” the only appreciable advance in terms of the I-49 corridor
occurred in Louisiana and for reasons that were peculiar to that states’ needs. Interstate 20
through Shreveport and Interstate 10 through Lafayette were both included within the original
route plans for the interstate highway system. However despite being located along major east –
west transportation arteries, these two cities were separated by hundreds of miles of inadequate
roadways, which many believed could be detrimental to the states’ economic prosperity. It
seemed as if the absence of a north – south connection between Shreveport and Lafayette would
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ultimately undermine Louisiana’s entire interstate system. Policy makers, highway officials,
local citizens, and members of special interest groups appeared to work together to address these
concerns and have them recognized at the national level. Their collective efforts paid off in 1977
when the original segment of Interstate 49, which followed U.S. 71 for roughly 200 miles
through Louisiana, was approved for inclusion as part of the Interstate Highway System when
the AASHTO officially designated extensive mileage for the development of I-49 in Louisiana. 5
Similarly, at this time Arkansas had no north – south interstate highway, but also did not
have cities like Shreveport and Lafayette along east – west interstate corridors that needed to be
linked through a north—south corridor. In addition, it is quite likely that route placement played
a significant role regarding interstate mileage designation in Louisiana as opposed to Arkansas.
The initial two hundred mile segment identified as I-49 needed to follow a somewhat specific
route in order to provide the most logical connection between the two major cities located along
Louisiana’s east – west interstate highways. The original purpose of I-49 was to provide a north
– south transportation system to directly link Interstate 20 in Shreveport to Interstate 10 in
Lafayette. As a result, the placement of this route was not necessarily open for debate.
In Arkansas, Hammerschmidt had an entirely different situation to deal with regarding
the development of a north – south expressway. The location of this highly anticipated corridor
caused heated discussions throughout various regions across the state, and became quite a
controversial topic from the late sixties onward. Even though the Federal Aid Highway Act of
1973 opened the highway trust fund for the use of urban mass transit, it also included funding for
the priority primary route system. The bill authorized between two and three hundred million
dollars to be used per year for this supplementary system of roadways for the next three fiscal
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years until it was time to renew the highway bill. Hammerschmidt recalled that Arkansas
received around nine million the first year, and work officially started on what would become
Interstate 540. This segment ultimately received designation as part of the Interstate 49 corridor
from Kansas City to New Orleans.
While Hammerschmidt obviously believed this area needed a major north – south
expressway, he appeared to realize that an interstate route through western Arkansas was highly
improbable considering the position of the federal government during this time. It may be that
Hammerschmidt had planned all along for U.S.71in Arkansas to eventually become I-49 and
connect Kansas City to New Orleans. The priority primary route system was first introduced in
the 1972 highway bill. As cosponsor of the bill, Hammerschmidt was in a position to include
U.S. 71 as one of the routes in need of immediate funding. Even though the 1972 bill did not
pass, Hammerschmidt had effectively insured the inclusion of this highway within the priority
primary route system. Thus, it appeared that he had begun to lay the initial groundwork for this
segment to receive the necessary upgrades to one day be included as part of the interstate
highway system. In the beginning federal funds were limited, but over the course of many years
Hammerschmidt continued to push legislation through Congress that supported the
redevelopment of the U.S 71 corridor. This enabled Hammerschmidt to receive federal aid
funding of twenty or thirty million dollars at a time for Arkansas highways. However, because
the money was not designated specifically for the interstate system, the state highway department
was responsible for deciding the best use for these funds. 6
From the beginning, Hammerschmidt felt that “[i]f we don’t get this road started, the
Arkansas Highway Department and the way the commission’s structured, they’re never gonna

6. Hammerschmidt, interview, 212-214.
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get that road down to Winslow and Alma built. I mean, they’re never gonna get it replaced.” 7
Despite his untraditional methods, Hammerschmidt recognized the importance of a north – south
transportation corridor through northwest Arkansas and whenever he received federal funding he
made sure to “put it in this northern part – north of Alma – I always said where it had to go. I
wouldn’t let the highway department move it or anything. And I’m – I just put it in there
specifically. And that’s where it had to go.” Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Hammerschmidt
basically “forced that road on ‘em, but – and they’re glad I did, but Lord, I don’t know what
we’d do about that traffic.” 8 Over the decades, traffic congestion continued to worsen along U.S
71, and the number of accidents steadily increased. Many of Hammerschmidt’s constituents
were concerned with the hazardous driving conditions. Yet, even with the federal aid
Hammerschmidt was funneling into the project, it was never enough, and progress was slow. By
the late 1980s only small segments of U.S. 71 had been upgraded. Northwest Arkansas was
growing rapidly, and did not have the infrastructure necessary to support this level of expansion.
Many assumed the Interstate era had finally come to an end, and that the Surface
Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987 would be the last highway bill to
authorize interstate funding. 9 However just four years later, one of the most significant pieces
of highway legislation was signed into law by President George H.W. Bush. According to
President Bush, The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA)
represented an “investment in America’s economic future” and he considered it to be “the most

7. Ibid., 213.
8. Ibid., 215.
9. U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Highway
History, President Ronald Reagan and the Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation
Assistance Act of 1987, Richard F. Weingroff, October 15, 2013,
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/rw01e.cfm (accessed June 2, 2015). (Hereafter cited as:
Highway History, President Ronald Reagan).
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important transportation bill since President Eisenhower started the Interstate System 35 years
ago.” President Bush felt that “an efficient transportation system is absolutely essential for a
productive and efficient economy” and that it was necessary for the nation to “start improving
our roads and bridges and railways, our equal opportunities to the future.” As a senior ranking
member of the House Public Works and Transportation Committee, Hammerschmidt played a
central role in the creation of this bill and shared President Bush’s enthusiasm regarding its
importance to the future of American transportation and infrastructure. 10
After over twenty years in Congress, Hammerschmidt now had more influence than ever,
which put him in a position to draft a bill that he believed would be crucial for highway
development in Arkansas. Hammerschmidt realized that certain provisions outlined in ISTEA
would be instrumental in regards to the construction of a major north – south transportation route
between Kansas City and New Orleans. The legislation identified an area almost parallel to the
U.S. 71 route from northern Louisiana to Kansas City as NHS High Priority Corridor Number
One, and the segment between Lafayette to New Orleans, as High Priority Corridor Number
Thirty-Seven. While this did not mean initial interstate highway designation, identification as
High Priority Route Corridors within the National Highway System (NHS) meant significant
funding for these highways. Through his work on ISTEA, Hammerschmidt forced the federal
government to finally accept the existence of a major north – south transportation void through
the heart of the country. This legislation helped provide the necessary funding to improve this
route as well as a number of other inadequate principle arterial roadways across the nation. 11
In preparation for this landmark piece of legislation, the American Association of State
Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) along with the Federal Highway

10. Public Roads, Creating a Landmark.
11. Lindsey, e-mail; Public Roads, Creating a Landmark.
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Administration (FHWA), created focus groups at the request of the Bush administration, to help
determine the future of the United States transportation system and infrastructure development.
In the late 1980s both the AASHTO and the FHWA published studies that proposed a need for
the creation of a new National Highway System (NHS). This would offer similar benefits to
those provided by the Interstate Highway System, while giving the states more power and
flexibility to determine the necessary highway standards based on local needs. The NHS
proposal would also avoid the controversy surrounding the additional designation of Interstate
mileage. 12 President Bush responded to these findings with the creation of the Surface
Transportation Act of 1991 (STAA). The bill highlighted NHS as a key component and stated
that the “[f]ederal investment would be focused on maintaining and improving a national
highway system that would serve interstate and interregional transportation.” However, STAA
received criticism from urban officials, environmental groups, and those in favor of increased
federal funds for the development of mass transit systems. 13
The majority of the Senate also opposed STAA and in its place created S.965, the Surface
Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (STEA). The original version of this bill did not include a
provision for NHS. As a result, Hammerschmidt and other ranking members of the House
Public Works and Transportation Committee enlisted the work of FHWA Administrator Larson
to draw up a map highlighting preliminary NHS routes. “Larson, with his academic and
intellectual roots, was not a “highway man”” yet he provided convincing testimony in favor of
NHS:

12. Public Roads, Creating a Landmark.
13. Ibid.
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To improve national productivity and make most efficient use of the limited resources
available, and given that 98 percent of all surface passenger movement and 75 percent of
all freight value today moves on highways, federal surface transportation strategy and
investment must focus on a select, but integrated, network of principal highways. ...
While we are moving to the post-Interstate construction era, we are not yet ready for a
post-highway transportation economy.

Despite Larson’s testimony the Senate remained opposed to NHS. Yet ultimately the final
version of the bill included a small provision which allowed for the proposal of a National
Highway System to be submitted to and presented before Congress in two years. 14
Following true to form, the House version of the highway bill was vastly different from
S.965. The creators of this bill included Representative Robert A. Roe, Chairman of the House
Committee on Public Works and Transportation; Representative Norman Mineta, Chairman of
the House Surface Transportation Subcommittee; Representative Bud Shuster, top ranking
Republican on the House Budget Committee; and Representative John Paul Hammerschmidt, top
ranking Republican of the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation. These four
senior Congressmen designed this highway bill, which they felt was a significant piece of
transportation legislation. It included an increase in gas tax, a provision opposed by both the
Senate and the White House, but one that “did not deter the “Big Four” – Roe, Mineta, Shuster,
and Hammerschmidt – from releasing the Intermodal Surface Transportation Infrastructure Act
of 1991 (H.R. 2950).” Additionally it called for the identification of up to 155,000 miles of
routes to be included in NHS and submitted to Congress by 1993, with the stipulation that
“[p]rior to approval, any route classified on the basis of function as a principle arterial would be
eligible for NHS funds.” The bill also introduced “long-range plans and feasibility studies for
NHS “High Priority Corridors,” to require the states to give priority to their construction, and to

14. Ibid.
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provide increased funding for them.” The ranking House Representatives, or the “Big Four”
agreed that this legislation was not simply “about highway transportation” and instead argued
that “[i]t would provide “an intermodal system for the next 10 years and the 21st century.””
However like many previous highway bills, this piece of legislation was destined for debate in a
House – Senate Conference Committee. 15
Just one day into the Conference, “the House passed a motion, 394 to 3, directing the
House Conferees to insist upon the House provisions for NHS, which Rep. Hammerschmidt
described as “the centerpiece of the restructured highway program that is being proposed for the
post-Interstate era.”” Despite this stipulation, the House – Senate Conference Committee
reached an agreement that became known as the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency
Act of 1991 (ISTEA). Soon after, both the House and Senate voted in favor of the provisions
outlined in ISTEA, which included a National Highway System, and additional funding for NHS
High-Priority Corridors. 16
ISTEA enabled Hammerschmidt to insure the availability of sufficient funds for the
construction of what would ultimately become Interstate 540 through northwest Arkansas. In an
article for the Arkansas Democratic Gazette, Hammerschmidt discussed his work on I-540 and
said “[w]e received about $400 million mostly for the 3rd District through ISTEA . . . [t]hat was
all out of the highway trust fund, not from income taxes.” Even without extensive
documentation from the 1970s and 1980s, it is obvious that Hammerschmidt struggled for years
to help Arkansas receive funding for this project. He stated that “[g]etting I-540 built, however,
actually had been in the works for about 23 years before it was completed.” 17 Hammerschmidt

15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Bowden, “Northwest Arkansas Council,” Arkansas Democratic Gazette.
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understood the significant impact ISTEA would have on the construction of this long neglected
transportation corridor.
Despite his retirement from Congress the following year, Hammerschmidt continued to
play a crucial role in the development of Interstate 540 until 1999 when the entire segment was
officially opened to traffic. As chairman of the Northwest Arkansas Council from 1993 to 2006,
Hammerschmidt was strategically placed to see the project through to completion. 18 He worked
closely with Uvalde Lindsey who served as the Council’s first executive director from 1990 until
2005. Lindsey’s “job was to build I-49” and together he and Hammerschmidt endeavored to
achieve this goal. However, while still in Congress, and as a ranking member of the House
Public Works and Transportation Committee, Hammerschmidt informed Lindsey that “the
Committee was planning on conducting field hearings in preparation for the final writing of
ISTEA” and that one of these meetings would be held in Springdale. Along with
Hammerschmidt, the attendees
consisted of the most senior ranking members of the Committee, which gave the region
and its leadership the unique opportunity to present testimony that could really make a
difference in raising awareness of the region’s need for surface transportation
improvements. Mr. Walton, Don Tyson, JB Hunt, Alice Walton and others presented
testimony attesting to the need and importance of such improvement to the economy of
the region and the nation.

Lindsey believed that this hearing had a significant impact on the ISTEA designation of U.S. 71
as NHS High Priority Corridor Number One, “which opened the door for priority federal
highway funding to develop [this] route as a future part of the Interstate System.” 19

18. Ibid; Lindsey, e-mail.
19. Lindsey, e-mail.

77

Hammerschmidt felt that ISTEA provided “a catalyst to get [corporate magnates] Sam Walton
and Don Tyson and others involved” in the Northwest Arkansas Council.20
The Council was established as a private, nonprofit in 1990 by local business leaders who
felt that the individual cities and towns of Northwest Arkansas needed to come together as a
whole, in order to support the continued progression of the region’s economic growth and
prosperity. The improvement and development of the infrastructure systems within this area
became the Council’s primary focus. Northwest Arkansas was home to three successful and
rapidly growing corporations; Wal-Mart Stores Inc., Tyson Foods Inc., and J.B Hunt
Transportation Services Inc. The need for adequate infrastructure became increasingly apparent
for the expansion of these and other local businesses. According to Mike Malone, the current
Executive Director of the Northwest Arkansas Council, the success and expansion of the major
industries within “[t]his area was at a disadvantage because it was landlocked from other regions
on the map.” Throughout its first decade in operation, Council members worked to acquire the
funding necessary for the development of various infrastructure projects, including but not
limited to the construction of Interstate 540 from Alma to Bentonville. The Northwest Arkansas
Council’s early successes with infrastructure development derived from its ability to step back
and view the area as one region, not multiple towns and cities. By addressing issues from a
regional perspective, and looking at the bigger picture, Council members were able to advocate
for the projects needed to improve Northwest Arkansas as a whole. According to
Hammerschmidt, “[t]heir goal is not to serve themselves as individual members but to serve the
entire community, to upgrade the quality of life for everyone there.” 21

20. Bowden, “Northwest Arkansas Council,” Arkansas Democratic Gazette.
21. Ibid; Lindsey, e-mail.
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During his time as chairman of the Northwest Arkansas Council, Hammerschmidt, along
with executive director Lindsey, “and Senators Bumpers and Pryor, worked … to secure federal
ear-marks of about $250-300 million … in addition to the new NHS funding … [which]
prioritized and hastened the construction process,” along the U.S 71 route. 22 In 1997 and 1998
the Arkansas Highway and Transportation Department (AHTD) sought permission from
AASHTO for construction on Arkansas 540 to be included within the Interstate Highway System
as part of Interstate 49. However, this classification was denied. Instead, in 1999 the Alma to
Bentonville portion of Arkansas 540 was designated as a northern extension of the existing I540, and officially became named the “John Paul Hammerschmidt Highway”. 23
In June of 2014, Interstate 540 from Alma north through Bella Vista to the Missouri state
line received official classification as Interstate 49. Throughout Louisiana, Arkansas, and
Missouri, segments along this corridor are slowly nearing completion, with the ultimate goal
extending far beyond the original plans to provide a direct link between Kansas City and New
Orleans. Continued development of the Interstate 49 corridor will expand north to Winnipeg,
Canada, and cover a total of 1,700 miles. “Along the way, this North – South Interstate route
will intersect 9 existing East – West Interstate highways to create a comprehensive transportation
grid that will enhance the movement of food, goods, energy and people to and from anywhere in
mid-America and the rest of the world.” As of last year, it was estimated that eighty percent of I49 had been completed, yet significantly more funding will be necessary to finish up the
remaining twenty percent. Construction has not even begun on several large segments along the

22. Lindsey, e-mail.
23. Roadnow: I-540 AR, Interstate 540 Arkansas,
http://m.roadnow.com/i540ar/Arkansas-Route-Description.html (accessed June 2, 2015).
(Hereafter cited as: Roadnow: I-540 AR).
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corridor, and sections of completed highway have not yet been connected, especially along state
lines.
The majority of work needed to finish construction on I-49 falls in the Arkansas where
the “route stretches from Texarkana, up through De Queen, Mena and Waldron, into Fort Smith
and on through Northwest Arkansas.” A 2009 newspaper article outlined the I-49 situation in
Arkansas, “[e]fforts to fund and build a two-lane, interstate quality highway through western
Arkansas date back more than five decades … “[a]ll that stands in the way of this interstate
reality is several small segments at the Arkansas-Louisiana and Arkansas Missouri borders and a
large 185-mile segment between Texarkana and Fort Smith that posts a price tag of $3 billion.” 24
In 2012 the Missouri section of U.S. 71 between Kansas City and Joplin was included as
part of the Interstate 49 corridor; the only portion that remained incomplete “is a five-mile strip
south of Pineville to the state line, where it will connect to a bypass around Bella Vista, Ark.”
Missouri highway officials have said that the state will finish construction along the border when
Arkansas has the funding it needs to do the same. The price tag for completion of the proposed
Bella Vista bypass is much larger in Arkansas than in Missouri, as is the mileage. A 2012 state
sales tax increase helped provide Arkansas with enough funding to get the project started.
Construction is currently underway, yet a significant amount of federal aid is needed to complete
this segment. 25

24. “Local, state and federal officials sound off on I-49,” The City Wire,
https://www.thecitywire.com/node/5689 (accessed July 15, 2015).
25. Todd Gill, “I-540 redesignated as I-49 in Northwest Arkansas,” Fayetteville Flyer,
http://www.fayettevilleflyer.com/2014/04/16/i-540-receives-new-highway-designation-innorthwest-arkansas/ (accessed July 15, 2015). (Hereafter cited as: Gill, “I-540 redesignated as I49,” Fayetteville Flyer); “U.S. 71 Highway to become I-49 on Wednesday: Long-term plan calls
for extension into Louisiana,” KMBC, http://www.kmbc.com/news/U-S-71-Highway-to-becomeI-49-on-Wednesday/17736398#ixzz2FWfA7GUh (accessed July 15, 2015); Justin Bates,
“Officials mark Interstate 49 designation, launch bridge campaign,” Arkansas News,
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When the U.S. 71 north – south corridor in Arkansas finally received official designation
as part of Interstate 49, the renamed segment covered roughly 65 miles in Northwest Arkansas
from Alma to just south of Bella Vista. Essentially the existing Interstate 540 was now federally
recognized “as part of a long-term plan to incorporate the stretch of road into a highway running
from Kansas City to New Orleans.” However, at this time Arkansas was still “awaiting Federal
Highway Administration approval to designate future sections of Interstate 49 between Interstate
40 and the Louisiana state line.” 26
Less than one year later in November of 2014, the I-49 segment connecting Arkansas and
Louisiana was officially opened to traffic between Shreveport and Texarkana. This was a major
step forward for the entire Interstate 49 corridor, now “a true Interstate from one state to
another.” 27 Even though I-49 originated in Louisiana it did not include the U.S. 90 route
between Lafayette and New Orleans. The state is still working to upgrade this section of
highway to interstate standards. Once completed, the southern most portion of “I-49 will provide
an additional hurricane evacuation route for the Louisiana gulf coast, as well as enhancing
economic development for the Port of New Orleans and other ports and cities along the route.” 28
However, the benefits of I-49 will not be fully realized until Kansas City is directly linked to
New Orleans.

http://arkansasnews.com/news/arkansas/officials-mark-interstate-49-designation-launch-bridgecampaign (accessed July, 15 2015).
26. Gill, “I-540 redesignated as I-49,” Fayetteville Flyer.
27. Adam Duvernay, “I-49 opens from Shreveport to Arkansas, beyond,” Shreveport
Times, http://www.shreveporttimes.com/story/news/local/louisiana/2014/11/10/opensshreveport-arkansas-beyond/18835875/ (accessed July 15, 2015).
28. “Our greatest challenge continues to be construction funding,” Interstate 49
International Coalition, http://www.interstate49.org/index.php?page=funding (accessed June 2,
2015).
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Unfortunately, the incomplete Arkansas section currently has close to 200 miles “without
designated funding or engineering work.” The construction along this portion of I-49 has been
completed in small increments. The most recent segment, just over 6 miles, officially opened in
July 2015 through Chaffee Crossing east of Fort Smith. At the opening ceremony local Chamber
of Commerce president Tim Allen expressed his hopes for the future “by saying a completed I49 through western Arkansas would put the Fort Smith region at the “crossroads of America.””
Plans are already underway for the next phase of development which “is the 15-mile section
between the I-40/I-49 interchange near Alma and across the Arkansas River into Barling.” Due
to the lack of available funding for this project, the Northwest Arkansas Council has been asked
to step in and help Fort Smith in efforts to “lobby state and federal officials for funding.” 29
Meanwhile, construction of the new Bella Vista Bypass has continued at a steady rate. An eightmile segment was completed in 2014 and another section was scheduled for completion in
August 2015. However, at this time the Bella Vista Bypass has yet to receive official I-49
designation. The next piece of federal aid highway legislation will ultimately dictate the
progression of this project.
The future of federal highway funding has increasingly become more uncertain as
Congress has struggled to create a comprehensive highway bill over the past year. In the quest to
formulate a long-term plan that will generate the revenue necessary to adequately fund the
nation’s highway system, Congress has issued a number of short-term extensions in order to
continue highway funding until a more permanent solution can be agreed upon. However, this
has caused several states to become wary about any major highway development plans. In June

29. Michael Tilley, “Gov. Hutchinson: New I-49 stretch a good start but more is
needed,” The City Wire, http://www.thecitywire.com/node/38162#.VbI1OpR4pIA (accessed
July 15, 2015).
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2015, Oklahoma Senator Jim Inhofe stated that “[o]ur nation’s roads and highways have suffered
under too many short-term extensions, which have led to higher costs, more waste, and less
capability to prioritize major modernization projects to address growing demands on our
interstates.” 30 Interstate 49, primarily the north – south route through Arkansas, may once again
be dependent on what could possibly become another landmark federal aid highway bill.

30. Ibid.
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Conclusion

A century ago the United States government began the first federally funded highway
program, which ultimately led to the creation of well over 40,000 miles of limited access
expressways that crisscross the nation today. While certain types of roadways had long been part
of the American landscape, the details regarding construction, placement and funding were dealt
with at the local level as needed. Railroads reigned as the predominate mode of transportation
for goods and people across the country leaving no real necessity for a nationally connected
system of highways, even when the first Federal Aid Road Act was passed in 1916. However
with the advent of the automobile the government felt it needed to at least play a small role in
assisting states with road development throughout the nation. The automobile became wildly
popular during the roaring twenties and the need for a transcontinental highway network became
increasingly evident. After dominating American transportation for close to a hundred years, the
railroads reached their peak in the 1920s and then began to slowly decline as more travel
alternatives became available. This trend continued until the late sixties and early seventies, and
ended with the discontinuance of all private passenger rail services.
The end of passenger railways significantly impacted the transportation of goods and
people, specifically in rural areas. When the Kansas City Southern Belle discontinued its last
remaining passenger trains, a major north – south transportation void was left between Kansas
City and New Orleans. Western Arkansans almost immediately realized the negative impact and
in the early 1970s began to push for the development of an interstate highway connecting these
two major cities. John Paul Hammerschmidt sympathized with his constituents and understood
the importance of the continued construction and improvement of the federal aid highway
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system. Except for the lost decade, Hammerschmidt worked tirelessly throughout his twenty-six
years in Congress to further the funding and development of Arkansas’s infrastructure. His hard
work would eventually pay off with the designation of Interstate 540, named the “John Paul
Hammerschmidt Highway” in 1999, and its inclusion as part of Interstate 49 in 2014, which
linked Kansas City to New Orleans along a route very similar to that of the Southern Belle.
However, the numerous issues surrounding federal aid highway legislation made this a long and
difficult process.
From the beginning, policy makers faced problems creating a highway bill that would
have widespread benefits across the United States and for almost half a century very little
progress was made. However, in 1956 it seemed as if politicians, special interest groups, and
highway engineers had finally agreed upon a predominately federally funded highway program
that would completely modernize and transform America’s infrastructure. The Federal Aid
Highway Act of 1956 authorized twenty-five billion dollars for the construction of 41,000 miles
of interstate highways to be completed over the course of thirteen years, with the federal
government funding ninety percent of the newly named National System of Interstate and
Defense Highways. However, by the early seventies numerous controversies surrounding
expressway development in urban areas became central themes for many policy makers in
regards to highway legislation. This proved to be detrimental to interstate construction in rural
states that still desperately needed improvements on all federal aid highway systems, as well as
the designation of additional interstate mileage. While Arkansans pushed for the development of
a north – south expressway soon after the discontinuance of passenger railways, it took almost
twenty more years for Hammerschmidt to get the legislation, logistics, and funding necessary to
move forward with construction along the U.S. 71 corridor from Alma to Northwest Arkansas.
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His greatest success came with the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of
1991which included a National Highway System and the designation of High Priority Corridors.
Hammerschmidt made sure this north – south interstate from Kansas City, south through
Arkansas, and on into Louisiana was number one on the list.
While considerable progress has been made, about twenty percent of the entire Interstate
49 corridor from Canada to the Gulf Coast still remains incomplete. In 2012 the majority of the
Missouri section received I-49 designation from Kansas City to just five miles north of the
Arkansas state line. Missouri is currently waiting on Arkansas to complete construction on their
portion of the Bella Vista bypass in order to finish the last remaining miles necessary to connect
I-49 between the Arkansas and Missouri border. In November of 2014, Interstate 49 was opened
from Shreveport to Texarkana, linking the Louisiana and Arkansas portions of this route. The
Louisiana segment currently under construction extends from Lafayette to New Orleans.
However the longest stretch along the I-49 corridor that is still in need of federal funding and
designation is in Arkansas, with the total cost of completion estimated at well over three billion
dollars. This segment extends for close to 200 miles between Texarkana and Fort Smith. There
are also smaller portions that are still under construction including a fifteen-mile section from
Interstate 40 near Alma to the Arkansas River. Additionally work is still being completed along
the Bella Vista bypass from Northwest Arkansas to the Missouri state line.
Once the remainder of the Interstate 49 route is completed, it will then connect with
Interstate 29 in Kansas City and extend north into Winnipeg, Canada. “Along the way, this
North – South interstate route will intersect 9 existing East – West interstate highways to create a
comprehensive transportation grid that will enhance the movement of food, goods, energy and
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people to and from anywhere in Mid-America and the rest of the world.” 1 The I-29 route
between Kansas City and Canada has already been completed and once I-49 is finished this
1,700 mile expressway will become a major international “uninterrupted Interstate Trade
Corridor from Canada through the heart of America to New Orleans - - and, through the Port
System of Louisiana, to Central/South America and points beyond through the expanding
Panama Canal.” 2 The transcontinental plans for this route offer a true testimony of
Hammerschmidt’s unwavering dedication and support of interstate highway development,
specifically a major north – south corridor through Arkansas. In the words of Uvalde Lindsay,
“[w]e would not have I49 today but for JPH and his successful work and effort.” 3

1. Interstate Guide: Interstate 49, History.
2. Ibid.
3. Lindsey, e-mail.
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